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PREFACE 
his report comes at crucial time.  The acute crisis in financial markets 
seems to have passed and the authorities can switch their attention 
from the overriding task of avoiding a meltdown to more strategic 
considerations. The crisis has shown that the chaotic failure of large 
complex financial institutions can have very large costs.  As this report 
argues convincingly, this implies that it will remain impossible to restore 
market discipline until some way can be found to allow even large 
institutions to fail in a less costly manner.   
Following the chaos that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, some have argued that the only solution is to break up all large 
financial institutions and that their risk-taking activities must be limited by 
law.  Such actions are by no means necessary, however, and they may be 
hard to implement in practice and could entail large costs in terms of the 
availability of credit to the economy (e.g. if they reduced the ability of 
banks to hedge their credit positions). This report shows that alternative 
solutions exist that can achieve a more stable and resilient financial system 
without renouncing the benefits of multi-purpose financial institutions and 
innovative finance. These are predicated on effectively curtailing moral 
hazard and strengthening market discipline on banks’ shareholders and 
managers by raising the cost of the banking charter to fully reflect its 
benefits for the banks, and restoring the possibility that all or at least most 
financial institutions could go bust, without triggering unmanageable 
systemic repercussions.  
This report concentrates on how these issues can be dealt with in 
Europe where the cross-border aspects are abundantly in evidence. The 
quality of the report is due not only to the very detailed analysis of the 
authors, but also to the quality of the participants in this joint CEPS-
Assonime Task Force, which received financial support from Unicredit and 
was composed of experts from large banks (and financial institutions), 
regulatory agencies and international organisations, bankruptcy judges and 
academics.  
Daniel Gros 
CEPS, March 2010 
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
ll EU cross-border banking groups would be required to sign up to 
a new deposit guarantee scheme managed by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA). The scheme would be fully funded ex-
ante by levying fees determined on an actuarial risk basis. Participating 
banks would undertake to provide all relevant information required for 
effective supervision to the EBA and the Colleges of supervisors.  
All banking groups would be supervised and, in case of need, 
subjected to mandatory resolution procedures on a consolidated basis, 
under the law of the parent company. Subsidiaries chartered in separate 
jurisdictions, but unable to survive a crisis of the parent company on their 
own, would also fall under the same authority.  
Banking groups would be free to set up fully stand-alone 
subsidiaries, under the law of the host countries, but the entities would 
then have to meet precise requirements of independence of capital, 
liquidity and other critical functions.  
All national supervisors would have administrative powers to 
manage early corrective action and resolution, according to the principles 
outlined by the Basel Supervisors.  
Supervision, early action and reorganisation would be managed by 
strengthened Colleges of supervisors, under the leadership of the parent 
company supervisor and a regime of full exchange of information amongst 
interested national supervisors. The Colleges of supervisors would make 
their proposals to the EBA, which would sanction them with its own 
decisions and would mediate disputes between national supervisors.   
By offering all interested parties in a resolution procedure the full 
guarantee that they will be heard and treated fairly before an independent 
authority, the EBA would create the conditions in which jurisdictions other 
than that of the parent company will be ready to accept delegating to the 
latter the resolution of the entire banking group on a consolidated basis. 
Mandated action will also ensure that supervisory forbearance would not 
be used to favour national interests to the detriment of stakeholders from 
other jurisdictions.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
s the financial crisis subsides, the new regulatory structure for the 
financial system is starting to take shape, with a number of 
legislative proposals already tabled, and even approved, in the 
United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom –  the latter of 
which is once again showing its readiness to act unilaterally without 
consulting its EU partners. What is striking about these developments is 
not only that responses are not coordinated between the main financial 
centres, but that new rules are proposed and enacted without a common 
understanding of the nature and causes of the financial crisis, raising the 
risk of excessive and inconsistent regulation. 
For instance, while most analysts would agree that credit-rating 
agencies should be stripped of their public franchise granted by US 
legislation, under whose cover they sold misleading ratings in the interest 
of issuers of toxic assets, the EU authorities have introduced similar 
legislation in the EU. Similarly, while there is little evidence that hedge 
funds contributed to the financial crisis in any manner, the idea that they 
should be subject to regulation, and even prudential supervision like banks, 
has political support.  
Most importantly, a lack of understanding of the causes and 
dynamics of the financial crisis is leading legislators to create a regulatory 
structure for large banks and other financial institutions that is based on 
misleading concepts of systemic risk and systemic instability and is likely 
to augment moral hazard and the potential liabilities for taxpayers in 
countries hosting large financial centres. 
Two fundamental truths should be recognised in this regard. First, 
herd behaviour by financial intermediaries and investors near the peak of a 
speculative bubble, both in the climb and the ensuing precipitous fall, 
wasn’t a haphazard phenomenon due to uncontrollable psychological 
A 2 | INTRODUCTION 
 
reasons. Rather, it was the result of destabilising monetary policy regimes 
in the leading financial centres – notably owing to the US Federal Reserve 
systematically intervening to prop up asset prices but never to counter their 
rise (Taylor, 2009; Carmassi et al., 2009).1 To the extent that herd behaviour 
is due to destabilising monetary policy, building anti-cyclical brakes into 
banks’ regulatory capital2 will not eliminate instability as long as monetary 
policy rules aren’t rectified. 
Second, the fact that increasingly large, complex and interconnected 
financial institutions almost brought down the entire world financial 
system does not lead automatically to the conclusion that a new layer of 
regulation specifically addressing these financial institutions is required – a 
suggestion first advocated by the Group of Thirty (2009) that has 
subsequently found widespread support. For one thing, this approach 
would implicitly accept that the sources of systemic instability cannot be 
brought down to at least manageable proportions, and must therefore be 
accepted as a permanent feature of the financial system. This is by no 
means a warranted conclusion. 
Explosive growth of financial intermediation was encouraged in the 
first place by asset inflation, which created opportunities for enormous 
gains from trading and speculative asset market positions. Within that 
context, institutional incentives were encouraging financial organisations to 
take reckless risks. The priority in regulatory reform should be to correct 
these distorted incentives, rather than forcing structural reorganisations 
and legal constraints on activities that may damage the efficiency of the 
financial system and hinder its ability to serve the credit needs of the 
economy. 
Back to basics, the explosive growth in financial intermediation 
(Figure 1.1) was fuelled by a massive increase in borrowing – leading to 
unsustainable leverage – which in turn was instrumental in a massive 
increase in open positions in high-risk securities of uncertain liquidity 
promising disproportionate gains. Much of the increase in financial 
                                                      
1 Similarly, in the events leading to the Great Wall Street Crash of 1929, (the 
promise of) lax monetary policy was embedded in the gold standard monetary 
regime. On this, see Galbraith (1954) and Kindleberger & Aliber (2005). 
2 As advocated by the so-called ‘Geneva Report’ of the International Centre for 
Monetary and Banking Studies (Brunnermeier et al., 2009).  OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 3 
 
intermediation took place within the financial sector itself (FSA, 2009a). The 
main source of funds for these asset market positions was the wholesale 
interbank market where large cross-border banks were the residual 
suppliers of liquidity for all the other players in the game (see Gorton & 
Metrick, 2009; Tucker, 2010). In practice, these banks were using their 
deposit base to multiply funds for speculation and generate a gigantic 
inverted pyramid of securities made up of other securities and yet again 
other securities. When asset prices started to fall, the house of cards fell 
back onto the banks, calling into question their ability to meet their 
obligations towards depositors and the very confidence in money. Without 
the money-multiplying capacity of the banks, the asset price bubble and the 
explosion of financial intermediation and aggregate leverage wouldn’t 
have been possible.  
Figure 1.1 Growth of banks’ total assets, 2000-07 (2000=100)* 
 
* US banks include Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase. US 
investment banks include Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch and Morgan Stanley. EU banks include BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Royal 
Bank of Scotland and UBS. 
Source: Own calculations based on annual reports. 
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The rapid growth of financial intermediation and risk exposures was 
driven by dramatic increases in profitability. The Economist estimated that 
in 2007 the financial sector represented some 10% of value added in the US 
economy, but some 40% of its profits. Alessandri & Haldane (2009) have 
shown that, after remaining stable at around 5-7% for several decades, the 
return on equity of large UK banks tripled during the past three decades. 
The promise of ever-larger profits thus led to a major diversion of resources 
from productive investment to speculation in financial markets.  
As one would expect, higher returns on equity were associated 
with higher return variability, indicating a sharply higher propensity 
to take risks (Figure 1.2). It appears that many financial institutions 
were behaving like ‘plungers’, rather than ‘diversifiers’, in James 
Tobin’s classical terminology (Tobin, 1958): they were using all the 
levers of financial technology to achieve the largest possible return 
regardless of risk. 
Figure 1.2 Return on equity for UK banks 
 
Source: Alessandri & Haldane (2009). 
In turn, increasing returns were in the main achieved by leveraging 
own capital to unprecedented heights, increasing the share of proprietary 
assets in trading books, and taking bets on increasingly risky assets. As has OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 5 
 
been shown, these strategies have the effect of raising the sensitivity of 
banks’ return on equity to aggregate market risk – in financial parlance, 
their  β coefficient. Thus, what was trumpeted as shrewd management 
leading to higher institution-specific (α) returns, increasingly amounted to 
banks becoming exposed to similar risks, thus enhancing their exposure to 
common aggregate shocks (Alessandri and Haldane 2009).3 
Such widespread use of extreme investment strategies by bankers 
indicates the presence of incentives affecting all banks, that is, the moral 
hazard created by the expectation that large banks will always be bailed 
out, owing to the feared consequences of their failure on overall financial 
stability. The downside in bankers’ risk–return matrices was effectively 
truncated by public protections designed to preserve confidence in money 
and the banking system, which de facto entailed that banks could not fail. 
The events of the past two years have only aggravated the problem since 
the mishandled failure of Lehman Brothers convinced even more policy-
makers and regulators that large financial institutions cannot be allowed to 
fail, effectively removing market discipline from large chunks of financial 
markets.  
Thus, the debate on regulatory reform has been misled into 
concluding that there is no alternative to breaking up large financial 
institutions or limiting by law their risk-taking activities, as influentially 
advocated by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and 
currently Chairman of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under 
President Barack Obama.4 However, this may be hard to do in practice5 and 
                                                      
3 As explained by Borio (2003), monitoring the financial system’s exposure to 
aggregate shocks is precisely the main intended task for the new macro-prudential 
supervision that all the main regulatory systems are embracing as a panacea 
against a repetition of the horrendous event s  o f  2 0 0 8 .  O f  c o u r s e  c o l l e c t i n g  t h e  
information can do no harm: but it does not explain, nor remove, the reasons why 
so many sophisticated bankers had earnestly pursued strategies that proved 
eventually to be so destructive for their organisations and their personal fortunes.  
4 See G-30 (2009), Recommendation 1b, pp. 27-28, and Volcker (2010).  
5 On this see Martin Wolf, “Why narrow banking alone is not the finance solution”, 
Financial Times, 29 September 2008, and “Volcker’s axe is not enough to cut the 
banks down to size”, Financial Times, 27 January 2010. As has been argued, to an 
important extent risks were taken by banks indirectly, by financing positions 
formally in the books of other intermediaries through the interbank market. 
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could entail large costs for the availability of credit to the economy (e.g. if it 
reduced the ability of banks to hedge their credit positions).  
We believe that such measures are by no means necessary: alternative 
solutions exist that can achieve a more stable financial system without 
renouncing the benefits of multi-purpose financial institutions and 
innovative finance. They are predicated on effectively curtailing moral 
hazard and strengthening market discipline on banks’ shareholders and 
managers by raising the cost of the banking charter to fully reflect its 
benefits for the banks, and restoring the possibility to go bust for all, or at 
least most financial institutions, without unmanageable systemic 
repercussions. The new incentive structure for bankers should suffice to 
bring bloated finance back to normal proportions, relative to underlying 
economic activity, and make the financial system less exposed to systemic 
shocks.6 
The new regulatory architecture must correct an obvious pitfall in 
banking regulation, that is, reliance on capital requirements based on risk-
weighted assets. This approach is flawed since asset risk cannot be assessed 
and measured independently of market conditions and market sentiment 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Kay, 2009). As a result, the need for capital will 
always be underestimated under favourable market conditions, leading to 
balance-sheet fragility and precipitous asset sales when market sentiment 
turns around.7 Empirical evidence has confirmed that many financial 
                                                                                                                                       
Therefore, placing constraints on banks’ securities positions may not be sufficient 
to impede reckless risk-taking; on the other hand, the legal restrictions required to 
eschew all unwanted risk-taking may cripple the banks’ ability to operate also in 
their normal commercial lending business. 
6 There would also be less need to regulate non-bank financial institutions, such as 
(pure) investment banks and private pools of capital (Di Noia & Micossi, 2009). 
Insurance companies should be restrained by the general rules of insurance, which 
require that all risks should be covered by adequate reserves determined from the 
probability distribution of adverse events. Writing up indefinite amounts of credit 
default swaps (CDS) on unknown risks, as AIG managed to do through its 
Financial Product division (AIGFP), should be illegal under general insurance 
regulation, without creating another domain of prudential regulation. 
7 “In an uncertain world values will also be uncertain, and the margins of 
uncertainty are very wide. The measurement of capital is not, and will never be, 
simultaneously exact or objective, and economically meaningful. The risk 
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institutions that got in trouble had shown comfortable regulatory capital 
(IMF, 2009).  
However, we are not ready to recommend that capital requirements 
be scrapped altogether, as advocated by Kay (2009). A capital buffer is 
needed because massive asymmetries of information between bank 
managers, on the one side, and investors and regulators on the other, make 
it easy for bankers to accumulate excessive risks, in the quest for higher 
returns, before markets become aware. The dependency of large banks on 
wholesale markets, where ‘runs’ may happen even where retail deposits 
are well protected, confirms the limitations of risk-based capital and the 
need to refer to total leverage.8 By limiting maturity transformation, 
regulatory capital places an automatic ceiling on risk-taking; monitoring 
capital in relation to total exposure reduces the need for close monitoring of 
the quality of banking assets.9 Thus, capital requirements should be set in 
straight proportion to total assets or liabilities of banking groups.10  
                                                                                                                                       
associated with a given portfolio of assets is only loosely related to the aggregate 
value of the assets … And it is a basic principle of risk analysis that the aggregate 
r i s k  o f  a  p o r t f o l i o  c a n n o t  b e  m e a s u r e d  b y  a d d i n g  u p  t h e  r i s k s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
elements.” Kay (2009, p. 8). Building anti-cyclical capital buffers may at best 
attenuate, but will not resolve the problem: any regulatory definition of capital 
allowances for risk is bound to create profitable opportunities for circumventing 
the rule. 
8 This aspect was called to our attention by Maria Nieto. 
9 A separate question that goes beyond the scope of this report is whether 
regulatory capital requirements should also be imposed on non-bank financial 
institutions, as such not enjoying the banking charter benefits. A prudent answer, 
taking into account the lessons from the recent crisis, is that any institution raising 
funds from the money market to invest in capital market securities, hence 
undertaking significant maturity transformation, should be required to hold a 
minimum regulatory capital, as a backstop against the potential shocks generated 
by its losses for the lenders of its liquidity.  
10 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has already envisaged the 
introduction of a leverage ratio unadjusted for risk, but as a complement rather 
than a substitute of risk-adjusted capital requirements (BCBS, 2009a). There is also 
a need to simplify and harmonise the definitions of capital across jurisdictions, 
notably by restricting regulatory capital to cash and equity and scrapping the more 
exotic components of dubious value in case of crisis (Di Noia & Micossi, 2009). 8 | INTRODUCTION 
 
Fixing flaws in prudential capital rules does not remove moral 
hazard from the banking system, whose specific sources must be tackled 
separately, as will be discussed in the ensuing chapters. These are: a) the 
deposit-institution franchise, b) the implicit or explicit promise of bailout in 
case of threatened failure and c) regulatory forbearance. 
The problem associated with the deposit franchise is well known 
(Rochet, 2008). Banks collect funds by offering to redeem deposits at par on 
demand; and make money by deploying the funds thus obtained in loans 
and investments with longer maturity; and keep (uncertain) capital to meet 
deposit redemptions. As long as depositors feel safe, they will not seek 
redemption of their deposits, but if they have doubts on the bank’s 
solvency, they will all run for the exit, forcing rapid liquidation of banks’ 
assets, possibly with large losses. A run on one bank may easily spread to 
other banks and endanger overall financial stability, as all banks scramble 
to recuperate liquidity by selling assets and calling back their credit lines in 
the interbank market.11  
Deposit insurance can be effective in calming depositors’ fears, but it 
also mutes their incentive to monitor the management of their banks, since 
they no longer risk losing their money. More importantly, deposit 
insurance has evolved in most countries into a system effectively protecting 
the bank, or the entire banking group, rather than the depositors: when a 
bank risks becoming insolvent, rather than simply letting it fail and pay its 
depositors, supervisors often step in to cover its losses and replenish its 
capital so as to avoid any adverse repercussions on market confidence. 
Moreover, most deposit insurance systems are inadequately funded by 
                                                      
11 For an illuminating description of the contagion mechanisms that almost brought 
down world banking following Lehman’s failure in September 2008, see Freixas 
(2009). Tucker (2010) examines the various ways in which banks used instruments 
such as money market mutual funds, asset-backed commercial paper and off-
balance sheet vehicles to apparently increase liquidity by off-loading loans and 
securities and reducing maturity mismatches in their balance sheets – which came 
back to haunt them when the markets for these instruments became illiquid. By 
booking activities outside their balance sheets, banks were creating ‘shadow 
banks’, which were not subject to banking prudential rules. The effectiveness of 
banking regulation is obviously predicated on the ability to prevent non-bank 
financial institutions from acting like banks – notably by promising redemption of 
their liabilities on demand and at par – without a banking charter.  OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 9 
 
insured institutions, entailing an implicit promise that taxpayers’ money 
will make up the difference, notably when confronting failure of a large 
bank. 
Therefore, offering deposit accounts generates the very important 
benefit, for the bank or banking group, that markets and ordinary people 
are led to believe that the organisation as a whole is safe. As a result, they 
are more inclined to do business with that organisation and take greater 
risks than would otherwise be prudent. The bank, thus, will feel less 
pressure to hold adequate reserves and will be encouraged to tap its 
liquidity and capital buffers to raise returns. Therefore, its deposit base – 
while a source of stable funding – creates the occasion and the incentives 
for the bank to overextend and take excessive risks. 
In sum, while financial stability is indeed much strengthened by 
deposit insurance, existing schemes must go back to their origin and cover 
only depositors, and never again other creditors, shareholders or the bank 
itself; no bail-out or recapitalisation of banks should be allowed under 
deposit guarantee schemes. The incentive for all stakeholders to monitor 
closely management strategies and risk-taking in their bank would be very 
much strengthened. 
A related aspect in re-establishing a proper price for the banking 
charter is that banks should carry ex-ante the full cost of deposit protection, 
determined so as to make sure that in most circumstances the guarantee 
fund would be adequate to reimburse depositors when individual banks 
fail. Of course, no fund could ever be sufficient to meet a general banking 
crisis; but a fund of an appropriate size would offer adequate protection in 
normal circumstances, with only a predictable share of banks going 
bankrupt. This would be sufficient to bring about a more stable and 
resilient banking system where the likelihood of a systemic crisis would be 
smaller, since each bank would be less prone to excessive risk-taking.  
Individual banks’ fees for the deposit guarantee should be 
determined on the basis of a careful probabilistic assessment of the 
likelihood of failure within the overall pool of deposits and risks of the 
banking system (within appropriately defined market jurisdictions). This is 
where the risk profile of banks’ asset and loan portfolios can be taken fully 
into consideration, together with, more broadly, the quality of bank 
management and risk control, thus creating effective penalties for riskier 
behaviour. Appropriate weights could also be applied to excessive reliance 
on less stable sources of finance, such as the wholesale money market, 10 | INTRODUCTION 
 
doubtful liquidity of investments, or opaque and complex legal structures. 
Size itself could be appropriately penalized by higher fees that would 
incorporate a probabilistic price for the potential threat for systemic 
stability. 12 
The second pillar required in order to greatly limit moral hazard in 
the financial system is removing credibly the promise that some financial 
institutions cannot fail. To this end, all main jurisdictions should establish 
special resolution procedures applicable to banks and banking groups, 
managed by an administrative authority, capable of tackling a bank crisis 
by acting early to correct emerging capital weaknesses, intervening 
decisively in promoting required reorganisations and, once all this failed, 
liquidating the bank with only limited systemic repercussions. Crisis 
prevention, reorganisation and liquidation would all be part of a unified 
resolution procedure managed for each bank or banking group in every 
country by an administrative authority with adequate powers, as will be 
described.13 
In order to make resolution feasible, all banks and banking groups 
would be required to prepare and provide to their supervisors a document 
detailing the claims on the bank and their order of priority, the full 
consolidated structure of legal entities that depend on the parent company 
for their survival, and may therefore produce liabilities for the parent 
company, and a clear description of operational – as distinct from legal – 
responsibilities and decision-making, notably regarding functions 
                                                      
12 Maria Nieto has suggested that the quality of supervision should also be taken 
into account in pricing banks’ risk (Hardy & Nieto, 2008; see Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 
2010, for a similar approach). However, within the European Union such an 
approach does not seem feasible, due to the resulting stigma on national 
supervisors. A viable alternative could be to give real teeth to the peer review of 
national supervisors now envisaged in the proposals before Council and 
Parliament for strengthened supervision in the EU. On a different line of argument, 
Achim Dübel has argued that it is not possible to have risk-based fees for deposit 
insurance without allowing for risk-based deductions from capital requirements – 
unless one is willing to envisage highly differentiated charges for deposit 
insurance. As we shall explain, this is precisely our approach.  
13 Masera (2009) stressed that there is a logical and operational continuum between 
crisis prevention and resolution and that it is hard to neatly separate the various 
phases of a banking crisis. OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 11 
 
centralised with the parent company. This ‘living wills’ document may also 
comprise ‘segregation’ arrangements to preserve certain functions of 
systemic relevance even during resolution: for clearing and settlement of 
certain transactions, netting out of certain counterparties, suspension of 
covenants on certain operations (BCBS, 2009b, and Hüpkes, 2004). 
In preparing their living wills, banks would be free to decide the 
structure and organisation of their business, notably regarding the decision 
to set up branches or subsidiaries in the foreign jurisdictions where they 
operate. However, separate resolution of subsidiaries, eschewing 
consolidation in the parent group, would only be allowed to the extent that 
they would be demonstrably fully independent of the parent company, 
would be unaffected by its liquidation and would not endanger its survival 
in case the subsidiary were wound up. 
I n  s u m ,  w h i l e  w e  u s e d  t o  t r y  a n d  p r e v e n t  b a n k  f a i l u r e s ,  n o w  t h e  
policy task should be to prepare for bank failures. Setting up such an 
apparatus requires that all national legislatures should adopt a set of 
common principles and administrative powers for early corrective action 
and resolution of a bank crisis, as has been recommended by the Basel 
Supervisors (BCBS, 2009b), but does not require full harmonisation of 
national laws. 
Finally, the third pillar of an effectively reformed financial system is a 
set of procedural arrangements that will strongly discourage supervisory 
forbearance, and indeed make it unlikely. To this end it is necessary to 
establish a system of early mandated action by bank supervisors ensuring 
that, as capital falls below certain thresholds, the bank or banking group 
will be promptly and adequately recapitalized. Should the bank fail to do 
so and capital continue to fall, then supervisors would be empowered to 
step in and impose all necessary reorganisation, including disposing of 
assets, selling or closing lines of business, changing management, ceding 
the entire bank to a stronger entity.  
Should this also not work, then liquidation would commence. A 
bridge bank would take over deposits and other “sound” banking 
activities, thus ensuring their continuity. All other assets and liabilities, 
together with the price received for the transfer of assets to the bridge bank, 
would remain in the “residual” bank, which would be stripped of its 
banking licence. An administrator for the liquidation of the residual bank 
would be appointed to determine its value and satisfy creditors according 12 | INTRODUCTION 
 
to the legal order of priorities, based on the law of the parent company and 
other jurisdictions involved.  
Supervisory discretion to postpone corrective action would be strictly 
constrained, so that bankers, stakeholders and the public would know that 
mistakes would always meet early retribution. Mandated corrective action 
has another attractive feature: asset disposals and change of management 
would normally take place well before capital falls to zero, so that losses for 
the insurance fund and ultimately taxpayers would be greatly limited.  
Within the European Union, the approach that has been described 
could be implemented through appropriate modification of the Directives 
on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (94/19/EC, 2009/14/EC), Reorganisation 
and Winding Up of credit institutions (2001/24/EC) and Capital 
Requirements (2006/48/EC), as will be described. Required changes would 
concern the following four aspects. 
First, all cross-border banking groups would be required to sign up to 
a new deposit guarantee scheme managed by the European Banking 
Authority (henceforth EBA). The scheme would be fully funded ex-ante – 
albeit perhaps a share of the money, say 25%, could be withheld by banks 
and made available on call – by levying fees determined on an actuarial 
risk basis. Participating banks would undertake to provide all relevant 
information to the EBA and the Colleges of supervisors.  
Second, all banking groups would be supervised, subjected to 
mandated corrective action, reorganised and, should the need arise, 
liquidated on a consolidated basis, under the law of the parent company; 
subsidiaries chartered in separate jurisdictions, but unable to survive a 
crisis of the parent company on their own, would also fall under the same 
authority.  
Third, all national supervisors would have administrative powers to 
resolve banking groups according to the common principles already 
outlined by the Basel Supervisors.  
Fourth, resolution of banking group in crisis would be managed by 
strengthened Colleges of supervisors, under the leadership of the parent 
company supervisor and a regime of full exchange of information amongst 
all interested national supervisors. The Colleges of supervisors would 
report to the EBA, under creation following the de Larosière Report 
recommendations, which would sanction all proposals by the Colleges with 
its own decisions. These decisions would include the initiation of early OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 13 
 
corrective action and all subsequent steps, and the mediation of disputes 
between national supervisors. 
Introducing these changes would be no small feat; however, their 
necessity has been amply demonstrated by the momentous events of 2008. 
A few jurisdictions have already adopted some of the legislative principles 
illustrated above.  
Placing the EBA at the centre of the system is especially important, 
since only in this way would all national supervisors and private interested 
parties be guaranteed of fair treatment, and thus be ready to accept the 
delegation of resolution powers to another jurisdiction. Mandated action 
would also give them the guarantee that supervisory forbearance would 
not be used to favour national interests in the parent company’s 
jurisdictions to the detriment of other stakeholders.  
The remainder of this report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 
focuses on deposit insurance: after analysing its rationale and describing 
the main features of various schemes around the world and in the 
European Union, it proposes a new European system of deposit guarantee. 
Chapter 3 discusses bank resolution regimes and identifies the requisites 
that a new EU system should possess in order to re-establish a credible 
threat of bankruptcy in the financial system. Chapter 4 describes the 
weaknesses of the current supervisory arrangements at EU level and 
proposes the establishment of a new system founded on existing national 
supervisory structures by entrusting all key decisions to the EBA. 14 | 
 
 
2.  A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF DEPOSIT 
GUARANTEE 
anks are ‘special’ financial intermediaries because they raise funds by 
accepting deposits redeemable on demand at par which perform, like 
currency, the functions of means of payment and store of value. The 
typically illiquid and longer-term nature of bank assets makes 
reimbursement of deposits difficult in case of sudden and simultaneous 
withdrawals by depositors; therefore banks are exposed to bank runs, 
which may be contagious and compromise trust in a main component of 
the money supply, endangering not only the banking system but the health 
of the entire economy.  
To resolve this problem deposit insurance came to life in the United 
States in 1933, following a dramatic wave of panic which forced at one 
point all banks to shut down.14 By limiting the danger that massive deposit 
withdrawals force banks to undertake a fire-sale of assets, deposit 
insurance is meant to eliminate a main source of systemic instability from 
financial systems.   
The example of the United States was later followed by most other 
countries: by 2009, almost 100 countries had introduced a deposit 
guarantee scheme (Alessandri & Haldane, 2009; see Figure 2.1).  
 
                                                      
14 See Calomiris (2000) for a detailed historical study on the origins of deposit 
insurance in the United States. 
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Figure 2.1 Adoption of deposit insurance and financial crises 
 
Trigger events: 1934 – Great Depression (US); 1977 – Banking crisis (Spain); 1982 – 
Banking crisis (Kuwait); 1985 – Banking crisis (Kenya); 1994 – Banking crises 
(Czech Republic, Uganda); 1995 – Banking crises (Brazil, Bulgaria); 1996 – Banking 
crises (Belarus, Lithuania); 1996-1998 – Asian crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand); 1998 – Banking crisis (Ukraine). 
Source: Alessandri & Haldane (2009). 
Deposit insurance schemes have been effective in preventing bank 
runs – albeit not banking crises – the only exception in recent years being 
represented by Northern Rock.15 However, it has its own drawbacks from 
the standpoint of financial stability since it weakens market discipline and 
creates moral hazard.16 Depositors, reassured by the guarantee on the value 
of their deposits, have less incentive to monitor bank management and 
performance. Thus, management not only has greater room for 
undertaking risky activities, but greater inducement to risk depositors’ 
                                                      
15 For a detailed study on the Northern Rock crisis, see Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2009) 
and Llewellyn (2009). 
16 Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) found empirical evidence that deposit 
insurance has an adverse impact on bank stability, the more so the higher the 
coverage, where the scheme is pre-funded and where it is run by the government 
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money in the expectation that any losses will be covered by the insurance 
fund and eventually taxpayers, while they will be able to keep for 
themselves a large chunk of the profits from risky bets. As a result, banks 
pay less dearly for money, while also benefiting at the same time from an 
implicit state subsidy on their speculative investments.  
Thus, the design of an effective deposit insurance system involves a 
trade-off between conflicting objectives. On the one hand, insufficient 
protection may weaken depositors’ confidence and raise the danger of a 
panic; on the other hand, a blanket protection may exacerbate moral hazard 
and compromise market discipline.17 
In the United States, the crisis of the savings and loan (S&L) 
associations in the 1980s provided a startling example of how deposit 
insurance may remove the incentives for depositors to exercise proper 
monitoring of their banks and encourage management to free ride. S&L 
associations’ shares had been granted deposit-like protection by the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in order to channel funds 
into mortgage lending. Cheap funding was used to acquire increasingly 
risky mortgages; and some S&L institutions also became heavily exposed to 
the high-yield ‘junk’ bond market (Chancellor, 1999). The sharp increase in 
interest rates of the early 1980s pushed large parts of the system over the 
brink. Rather than applying its regulatory powers to bring losses out in the 
open, the S&L regulator, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), 
relaxed capital requirements to gain time. Supervisory forbearance was 
encouraged by the insufficient pool of resources available to the FHLBB to 
prop up troubled institutions. The combined cost of reckless bankers’ 
behaviour and regulatory forbearance finally amounted to an astounding 
$150 billion and the FSLIC became insolvent and was shut down.18 
While policy blunders were probably responsible for precipitating the 
crisis, the run on Northern Rock in September 2007 has highlighted the risk 
of an ill-designed deposit insurance scheme. Northern Rock had 
aggressively expanded its balance sheet and built a large portfolio of 
                                                      
17 On the conflict between these opposing public policy goals and on an incentive 
compatible design of deposit insurance, see Beck (2004). 
18 On the S&L crisis, see Benston & Kaufman (1997) and Kane (1989, 1993). OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 17 
 
mortgages19 largely funded on the wholesale money market. The increase 
in interest rates and the seizing up of the securitisation market hampered 
its ability to roll over its short-term debt. The news that the Bank of 
England was extending emergency liquidity assistance to Northern Rock 
triggered the first bank run in the UK since 1866 (Overend & Gurney; see 
Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; and Bruner & Carr, 2007).  
However, a main reason for depositors’ fears seems to have been the 
limited protection provided by the UK deposit insurance scheme, 
characterised not only by a low coverage (deposits only up to £35,000), but 
also by a co-insurance mechanism whereby a percentage of losses (10%) 
would be borne by insured deposits above the minimum amount of £2,000 
(Schich, 2008). There were also doubts about the adequacy of the insurance 
fund to cover potential losses on insured deposits, and fears that in all 
events payments would be subject to long and unpredictable delays, 
causing both credit and liquidity losses. In particular, co-insurance 
apparently failed in making depositors more aware of their risks, indicating 
perhaps that retail depositors cannot be relied upon as a source of market 
discipline (Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 2009). 
Together with the importance of adequate funding, the crisis of 
Icelandic banks in October 2008 shed light on another critical feature of 
deposit insurance, i.e. cross-border arrangements. The three major Icelandic 
banks, Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing, had subsidiaries and branches 
in several European countries (including the UK, the Netherlands and 
Germany) where deposits had grown out of proportion thanks to over-
generous returns. Depositors were in principle protected by the Icelandic 
insurance which, however, had negligible resources relative to ballooning 
deposits. When depositors rushed for the exit, the banks could not meet 
their obligations; the UK authorities froze the assets of UK branches,20 
while their parent companies were nationalised by the Icelandic 
government. Their losses represent such a high share of Iceland’s GDP that 
repayment is unlikely.  
                                                      
19 Total assets more than doubled from £42 billion in 2004 to £109 billion in 2007 
and the bank’s share in the UK mortgage lending market increased from 6% in 
1999 to 19% in 2007 (Bank of England, 2007). 
20 Interestingly, the legal basis for the freezing was the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act, passed after September 11, 2001. See Buiter & Sibert (2008) for a 
detailed study on the Icelandic banking crisis. 18 | A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE 
 
In sum, deposit insurance is an effective system to eliminate bank 
runs from the financial landscape, but its rules and mechanisms must be 
carefully designed so as to tread a safe course between the opposite 
dangers of inadequate protection lacking credibility and excessive 
protection subsidising reckless risk-taking. Cross-border banking 
complicates the matter further by raising doubts about the effectiveness of 
protection and eventual responsibility for the losses.  
2.1  Confidence, financial stability and deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance schemes were introduced to protect banks and the 
integrity of certain functions, such as the payment system, at a time when 
the role of banks was substantially confined to deposit-taking and 
commercial lending. Since depository banks operate on the basis of a 
fractional reserve system, they perform a key function in the multiplication 
of monetary base and the transmission of monetary policy impulses.  
In the last four decades, the forces of deregulation, conglomeration 
and globalisation have deeply transformed the role of banks in the financial 
system, eroding the barriers between banking, insurance and the securities 
business. Legal geographical and functional restrictions on banks have 
been removed, notably in the US with the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
and in the European Union with the Second Banking Directive 
(89/646/EEC).  
As a consequence, the optimal design of deposit insurance has 
changed. In the traditional specialised environment, the protection of 
depositors and public trust in fiduciary money naturally coincided with the 
stability of banks: drawing the line within banks’ balance sheets between 
what deserved protection and what did not was not an issue. With banks 
competing for non-bank business, the twin question arises: on one hand, 
should deposit insurance de facto protect the banks themselves or should it 
instead concentrate on the protection of depositors alone? On the other 
hand, should insurance also be extended to non-bank intermediaries 
issuing monetary liabilities (e.g. money market mutual funds and 
commercial paper)?21 The critical aspect in deciding this issue is that, as has 
                                                      
21 In the United States in September and October 2008, the Federal Reserve 
introduced facilities of money market mutual funds and the commercial paper 
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been discussed, any explicit or implicit guarantee may encourage reckless 
risk-taking. On the other hand, financial supervisors are even less keen on 
letting financial institutions fail in the wake of the disastrous consequences 
of Lehman Brothers’ collapse.  
The large exposure of non-depository financial institutions to banks 
gave governments and central bankers a strong reason to bail out troubled 
non-bank financial institutions in order to preserve the banks. This was the 
case for AIG, which had sold massive amounts of credit default swaps to 
European banks, which had bought them for regulatory capital relief and 
would have been hardly hit by the collapse of AIG.22 Similarly, investment 
banks were over-exposed in the wholesale money market, where the main 
source of funds is constituted by very short-term bank credit lines (e.g. 
repos). De facto, all non-bank financial intermediation was ‘banking’ on the 
guarantee that banks would not be allowed to fail.  
This spurious extension of deposit guarantee to non-bank activities 
was even more blatant within bank holding companies, which were 
channelling depositors’ money to support their forays into high-yield 
market activities. Thus, complexity and interconnectedness were to a large 
extent the result of operations designed to spread the benefits of banking 
charters to most financial intermediation. 
A proposed solution to overcome the moral hazard problem is to 
revert to narrow banking, in the most extreme versions by imposing the 
condition that all money raised as deposits could only be invested in safe 
assets (Kay, 2009). In practice this would be equivalent to a 100% reserve 
requirement on all deposits, entailing of course that the money multiplier 
mechanism would be removed from the financial system and credit would 
be made available only from existing savings – thus entailing a sharp 
contraction in lending. Also, a strictly narrow banking system would 
eliminate monetary policy since “public debt held by banks would set the 
                                                      
22 See Di Noia & Micossi (2009) and Gros & Micossi (2008). As stated in the AIG 
2007 annual report: “Approximately $379 billion (consisting of the corporate loans 
and prime residential mortgages) of the $527 billion in notional exposure of 
AIGFP’s super senior credit default swap portfolio as of December 31, 2007 
represents derivatives written for financial institutions, principally in Europe, for 
the purpose of providing them with regulatory capital relief rather than risk 
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money supply”.23 Moreover, efficiency gains from diversification and 
economies of scale and scope might be lost.24  
It should be noted, at all events, that this approach does not require 
legal or structural separation of narrow banking from financial activities, 
but only that within each bank or banking group deposit-taking and 
associated portfolio investments are segregated functionally. All room for 
using deposit money for speculative capital market activities would be 
effectively removed from the system (for an overview of the pros and cons 
of narrow banking, see Box 2.1).25 
Box 2.1 Narrow banking 
There is no unique and unanimously accepted definition of narrow banking. 
Conceptually, narrow banking entails restricting the activities that banks are 
allowed to perform so as to separate deposit-taking and, in some versions, 
commercial lending from all other activities, with a view to eliminating or 
strictly limiting any maturity mismatch and liquidity risk when investing 
depositors’ money. In the strictest versions where deposit proceeds are 
invested in perfectly safe and liquid assets, deposit insurance becomes 
superfluous – except in the case of outright fraud. 
¾  There are two broad categories of narrow banking restrictions, i.e. a) on 
assets maturity: only short-term safe assets or short-term as well as long-
term safe assets; and b) on lending activity (prohibition or limitations). 
¾  Three proposed models of narrow banking:  
a)  Financial institutions draw a legal distinction between monetary 
service companies and financial service companies. Monetary service 
companies may accept deposits, provide payment services and are 
                                                      
23 Martin Wolf, “Why narrow banking alone is not the finance solution”, Financial 
Times, 29 September 2008. 
24 However, there is no clear evidence of these potential benefits related to financial 
conglomeration; see Laeven & Levine (2006) and Schinasi (2009). 
25 See Kay (2009) and King (2009). Di Noia (1994) provides an interesting variation 
of the narrow banking model, the ‘narrow-narrow banking’ model, according to 
which banks should only invest in safe assets the 100% of the positive difference 
between the total amount of deposit insured and the total compulsory reserves; the 
banking activity would thus be less restricted than in the classic narrow banking 
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permitted to invest only in short-term, highly marketable and highly 
rated instruments, such as short-term Treasury securities (and perhaps 
top-rated commercial paper). Financial service companies can perform 
all other financial activities (Pierce, 1991). 
b) Financial holding company can operate banking subsidiaries and 
separately incorporated lending subsidiaries; banking subsidiaries can 
invest in short-term and long-term safe and highly liquid securities 
(Litan, 1987). 
c)  Financial holding company with bank subsidiaries and lending 
subsidiaries: bank subsidiaries are allowed to invest in a wide range of 
safe assets and to engage in some form of commercial lending, e.g. 
loans to small firms. In this model the narrow bank is involved in 
credit creation (Bryan, 1991). 
¾  All these versions of narrow banking are ‘narrower’ than the Glass-
Steagall-style separation of commercial banking and investment banking. 
The narrow bank model separates lending and deposit-taking functions, 
even though this is softened when the narrow bank is part of a group that 
also performs lending activity through other subsidiaries.  
¾  Pros of narrow banking: elimination or minimisation of liquidity and 
maturity risks; minimal capital needs; no need for further regulation or 
safety net; deposit insurance only for risk of fraud; no moral hazard for 
bankers and fully restored incentive for investors in investment banks 
and in other financial institutions to monitor management behaviour.  
¾  Cons of narrow banking: no benefits from maturity and liquidity 
transformation; no efficiency gains and synergy effects from joint 
production of lending and deposit-taking; no money multiplier and limits 
to credit growth; in countries with sound public finances and low 
government debt, need to issue public debt in support of monetary and 
payment services; unsophisticated depositors only protected when they 
invest their savings in deposits; unknown implementing costs for lack of 
empirical evidence. 
Some policy-makers and commentators consider that the only 
feasible solution to tackle moral hazard and the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem is 
to cut down by decree all large financial organisations to a size that no 
longer threatens systemic stability, or legally separate commercial and 
investment banking, or make illegal proprietary trading by deposit banks. 
The US authorities have announced the introduction of a size limit that 
would cover all firms that control one or more insured depository 
institutions, as well as other major financial firms that are so large and 22 | A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE 
 
interconnected as to fall within the new regime of consolidated, 
comprehensive supervision (White House, 2010; Wolin, 2010). 
Paul Volcker (Volcker, 2010) has advocated that all FDIC depository 
institutions, as well as any firm that controls an FDIC-insured depository 
institution, should be prevented from engaging in proprietary trading, and 
from owning or sponsoring private equity funds or hedge funds (now 
commonly referred to as the ‘Volker rule’). The rationale of this proposal is 
to prevent non-bank financial institutions from free-riding on the safety net 
provided by central banks and regulators to commercial banks in view of 
the essential functions they perform. The US government has now 
subscribed to the Volcker rule (White House, 2010; Wolin, 2010). 
An alternative approach – in our view much preferable to narrow 
banking and the Volcker rule – would be to let banks continue to perform 
their broad range of functions but restrict insurance exclusively to 
depositors, which is needed to preserve confidence in money. In principle, 
this is precisely how US deposit insurance was meant to work.  
Well designed deposit insurance capable of making depositors feel 
safe but leaving all other bank creditors out in the cold would in practice 
achieve the same result as narrow banking – while avoiding its pitfalls. Of 
course, this approach would only be effective to the extent that explicit or 
implicit guarantee on any bank liability other than deposits were credibly 
ruled out – including short-term credit lines from other banks, bonds and 
shares. This principle should be embedded into legislation so that neither 
regulators nor national governments would be able to break or circumvent 
the rule.    
Under this approach banks would be free to undertake capital market 
activities as they judged fit, while shareholders and lenders of the bank 
would have a much stronger incentive to monitor management and the 
bank’s activities, since they would be fully exposed to the losses from 
excessive risk-taking, and they would know it. The preference granted to 
depositors would eliminate all uncertainty on the perimeter of the safety 
net.  
This was indeed the philosophy underlying the FDIC system (see Box 
2.2). It has failed in practice because some banks covered by the system 
were allowed to grow so large and undertake such massive risks that the 
available funds became irrelevant, relative to the size of emerging losses. 
The only alternative then was to extend a blanket guarantee to the financial 
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Box 2.2 The US Federal Deposit Insurance system 
Deposit insurance was introduced in the United States by the Glass-Steagall 
Banking Act of 1933, which established the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC received an initial capital endowment of $289 
million from the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Until 1990 the FDIC 
charged flat insurance fees of approximately 8.3 cents per $100 of insured 
deposits. In 1980 the deposit insurance fund was given a target range of 1.1% 
to 1.4% of total insured deposits, but the massive savings and loans losses 
depleted the fund. In 1989 the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) mandated that premia be raised to bring the 
fund up to 1.25% of insured deposits.  
In 1991 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) introduced a system of risk-based fees, to be calculated on the 
basis of capitalisation and the supervisory rating: three capitalisation 
categories (well capitalised, adequately capitalised and undercapitalised) 
and three supervisory rating groups (rating of 1 or 2, rating of 3, rating of 4 
or 5) were established. For large institutions in the lowest risk category other 
factors are also considered for risk-assessment, including the rating of long-
term debt, market data, financial performance indicators, the ability of an 
institution to withstand financial stress and loss severity indicators (see 
FDIC, 2009). From 1990 to 2006, over 90% of banks were classified in the 
lowest risk category (well capitalised and with a rating of 1 or 2). Moreover, 
the FDICIA and the Deposit Insurance Act of 1996 decided that the banks in 
the lowest risk category should not pay deposit insurance fees if the fund 
reserves were above 1.25% of insured deposits, which was the case 
throughout the period 1996-2006. In this decade, therefore, most banks did 
not pay deposit insurance.  
The FDICIA also introduced the system of prompt corrective action, 
which mandated the FDIC to intervene to impose recapitalisation on ailing 
banks well before full depletion of capital, with powers to close the 
institutions if they fail to do so. These interventions must respect the 
condition of least cost for the deposit insurance fund, unless a ‘systemic risk 
exception’ is invoked, which requires approval by at least two-thirds of the 
FDIC Board, two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board, and the US Treasury 
Secretary after consultation with the US President. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 substituted the 
‘hard’ target of 1.25% of insured deposits with a 1.15% to 1.50% range, and 
decided that when the fund exceeds 1.35% of insured deposits, 50% of the 
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excess funds are restituted. On the other hand, when fund reserves fall 
below 1.15%, the FDIC must raise premia to a level sufficient to restore them 
to this minimum level.  
During the financial crisis of 2007-09, the deposit insurance reserves 
progressively fell, going down to 1.01% of insured deposits on 30 June 2008, 
to 0.36% in the last quarter of 2008, and to 0.22% on 30 June 2009; the deposit 
insurance fund reserve ratio even became negative, at -0.16% on 30 
September 2009.  
On 22 May 2009, the FDIC board approved a final rule that imposed a 
5 basis points special assessment as of 30 June 2009 and on 29 September 
2009 the FDIC adopted an Amended Restoration Plan to replenish the fund 
and raise the reserve ratio up to 1.15% within eight years. To this end, 
insured institutions were required to prepay their estimated quarterly risk-
based assessments for the fourth quarter of 2009, and for all of 2010, 2011, 
and 2012. At the same time, the FDIC raised annual risk-based assessment 
rates by 3 basis points beginning in 2011. 
In 2009 the FDIC also obtained an increase in the credit line from the 
US Treasury from $30 billion to $100 billion, which can be raised to $500 
billion with the approval of the Federal Reserve and the US President. 
 
FDIC deposit insurance fund reserve ratio (2006-2009; % of insured deposits) 
 
Source: FDIC (2009). 
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Overall, historical experience of the FDIC deposit insurance 
demonstrates on the one hand that flat deposit insurance fees are ineffective 
to ensure the protection of the fund and its viability when a crisis occurs, 
and on the other hand that a system of risk-based fees does not 
automatically solve the problems. In fact, it has to be carefully drafted to 
make the fund as resilient as possible to crises and actually able to perform 
its function of deposit protection. To this purpose, a key objective is to avoid 
the pro-cyclicality of the balance of the fund, whereby the fund is in good 
shape in good times, but is rapidly exhausted in bad times: the assessment of 
the risk profile of banks and the proper pricing of deposit insurance are the 
key tools. 
Sources: Acharya, Santos and Yorulmazer (2009), FDIC (2009) and Pennacchi (2009). 
2.2   Key ingredients of deposit insurance 
In order to maintain market discipline and eschew moral hazard, the threat 
whereby the banks will not be rescued, only the depositors, needs 
additional foundation in the design of the deposit insurance system. 
Market discipline may be enhanced and moral hazard contained by 
introducing certain limitations on depositors’ coverage (BCBS & IADI, 
2009). First, as has been indicated, protection should be granted only to 
retail depositors, while wholesale and interbank deposits would be at 
lenders’ risk. Second, retail depositors should not enjoy full protection – 
albeit not so low as to compromise confidence – in order to keep them 
awake to the risk features of their banks. The amount set in the revised EU 
Deposit Guarantee Directive, €50,000 rising to €100,000, seems adequate.26 
As to co-insurance, it should not play a major role, since any positive effect 
on depositors’ willingness to monitor the bank’s performance and 
management may be offset by adverse effects on their confidence, as 
highlighted by the run on Northern Rock.  
                                                      
26 Directive 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009. Article 1, 3(a) envisages an increase of 
the coverage from €50,000 to €100,000 by 31 December 2010, unless the 
Commission determines that “such an increase and such harmonisation are 
inappropriate and not financially viable for all Member States in order to ensure 
consumer protection and financial stability in the Community and avoid cross-
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A critical feature is the size and financing of the insurance fund. The 
2007-09 financial crisis showed that deposit insurance schemes financed ex-
post, that is only after the need materialises, lack credibility because the 
deposit insurance fund is likely to be undercapitalised. Only ex-ante 
financing, based on probabilistic assessment of the risk of failure for each 
insured bank, appears capable of ensuring at the same time that the fund 
has sufficient resources and that each insured bank pays a fee 
commensurate with its actual risk position, hence the potential cost of its 
failure, thus mitigating moral hazard (BCBS & IADI, 2009) and 
strengthening depositors’ incentive to monitor the bank. Ex-ante financing 
is also less pro-cyclical than a call-when-needed system, which imposes 
higher costs when banks’ profitability is falling.27  
The fund should be required to meet its funding targets within a 
specified time period; premia should be collected and the fund should 
continue to grow even after the funding target is reached. The US system of 
returning premia once the funding target has been reached appears 
logically flawed – one doesn’t return insurance premia because the adverse 
event did not materialise – and is strongly pro-cyclical, with funds likely to 
be in excess in fair weather and insufficient in crisis (see Box 2.2). 
Risk assessment must reflect institution-specific factors – including 
not only size and asset quality, but a wide range of factors such as 
capitalisation, liquidity and maturity transformation, the quality of 
management and risk control, interconnectedness, complexity, functions of 
systemic relevance such as being a major supplier of CDS or offering 
clearing services for significant market segments. Fees should also take 
account of the bank’s exposure to systemic risks (based on stress tests) as 
well its likely impact on systemic risk in case of adverse macroeconomic 
                                                      
27 A key point to be emphasised in this connection is that the deposit insurance 
fund should be designed to deal with bank crises in ‘fair weather’; in the event of a 
systemic collapse no amount would suffice, short of full government guarantee 
(although the different components of the safety net should be capable of 
interacting through close coordination and information-sharing in such a crisis; see 
BCBS & IADI, 2009). Therefore, the size of the fund is much lower than the overall 
amount of insured deposits in a given country (e.g. between 1.15% and 1.50% in 
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shocks.28 Higher fees, in this context, could be required from banks 
operating in ‘overbanked countries’, e.g. showing high ratios of bank 
liabilities over GDP or the total tax base as indicators of local ability to take 
emerging losses in a crisis. 
It has been suggested in this context that the CDS spread already 
provides a synthetic measure of the default risk and therefore could be 
used directly to determine the insurance fee as a proportion of insured 
deposits. However, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the 
resulting charge could be too onerous and wipe out all banking profits.29 
Therefore, while the CDS may well be one important element in the 
calculation, it appears preferable to set fees on the basis of several factors, 
also including sustainability of the banking system. It must be well 
understood, however, that a considerable reduction in bank profits is a 
desirable feature of the insurance scheme, since inordinate profits from 
speculation played a paramount role in diverting resources away from the 
productive economy and into unproductive speculative activities.  
It should be stressed, in this context, that the objective of risk-based 
fees is not to penalise depository banks and banking groups for the deposit-
taking activity itself. Rather, it is to make banks pay the appropriate price 
for the banking charter and the related benefits (deposit insurance, access 
to discount window, etc.), based on the overall risk profile of the bank.30 
                                                      
28 Maino et al. (2009) propose a new approach to regulation and resolution of 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and argue that systemic risk 
should be covered by an ad hoc “insurance premium” for SIFIs, to be paid as fees 
to a specific Resolution Fund.  
29 John Kay, “Why ‘too big to fail’ insurance will not fix finance”, Financial Times, 3 
February 2010. 
30 The US Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee, recently announced in January 2010 
by the US President to recover the public resources injected to rescue and stabilise 
the financial sector, is based on a different logic. It applies to banks and other 
categories of financial institutions with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets 
and will be levied for at least 10 years. The fee is calculated as a proportion (about 
0.15%) of banks liabilities. Tier 1 capital and insured deposits are deducted from 
the computation, the latter being regarded as a stable source of funding and 
already paid for through deposit insurance fees. Thus, this fee would penalise 
those banks with a thinner deposit base and less capital. The underlying 
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To the extent that fees asked from large banks were adequate to deal 
with their failure, one main aspect of the too-big-to-fail syndrome, as 
identified by Acharya (2009) and Kay (2009), would be, if not eliminated, at 
least substantially reduced.31 If appropriately designed, these fees would 
entail a strong disincentive against growing too large. 
Risk-based deposit insurance seems to offer a superior tool for 
charging banks the correct price for their banking charter, regulatory 
protection and potential losses, also by taking into account immaterial 
factors that risk-based capital charges cannot reflect, but supervisors can 
fully consider thanks to their access to the whole of bank information.32 It 
would overcome the problem of distinguishing between systemic and non-
systemic banks since fees would gradually and continuously increase with 
risk (FSA, 2009b); there would be no need to set up a separate layer of 
regulation and charges for ‘systemic’ banks. 
Banks would still be required to hold capital as general reserve 
against unexpected losses and restraint against excessive risk-taking by 
management. However, capital requirements should be set as a straight 
minimum ratio to total assets or liabilities – net of net worth – with no 
allowance for risk factors.   
A key complement of deposit insurance is mandated corrective action 
by supervisors as bank capital falls below certain thresholds. Moral hazard 
and the potential costs for the fund are exacerbated if there is no mandated 
corrective action, because banks exploit the deposit insurance subsidy to 
engage in excessive risk-taking and will try to delay recognition of losses 
and to gamble for resurrection. Authorities could complacently favour such 
behaviour and even relax regulation in the hope of facilitating a recovery. 
                                                                                                                                       
assumption is that a lower core capital buffer and higher reliance on non-deposit 
funding imply higher overall risk. 
31 For a discussion of systemic risk premiums versus the breaking-up of large 
financial institutions, see Acharya, Cooley, Richardson & Walter (2009). 
32 The US CAMELS ratings provide an interesting model usable for this purpose, 
whereby a bank risk profile is assessed on Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, 
Liquidity and Sensitivity to risk. A question to be decided in this context is 
whether or not risk-assessments and deposit guarantee fees should be made 
public. Disclosure might enhance market discipline but also damage confidence in 
the bank. The US CAMELS are non-public information and property of the 
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Besides, the subsidised institutions are presumably those that are the least 
worth saving, so that forbearance produces the undesirable outcome of 
wasting taxpayers’ money in the most inefficient manner.33 
Ultimately, gambling for resurrection and forbearance would amplify 
the losses for the deposit insurance fund and could deplete its financial 
resources and hinder its ability to protect depositors. Therefore, mandated 
corrective action is essential in order to ensure the credibility of deposit 
insurance.34  
2.3  An overview of deposit guarantee schemes 
Deposit guarantee schemes came under enormous pressure worldwide in 
the wake of the financial crisis, which highlighted their weaknesses. In 
September 2008, Ireland decided – without consulting the European 
Commission, the European Central bank or any of the EU member states – 
to increase the statutory limit for the deposit guarantee scheme for banks 
and building societies from €20,000 to €100,000 per depositor per 
institution, with a 100% coverage for each individual deposit. Initially, it 
tried to cover only depositors at Irish banks but renounced this obvious 
discrimination almost immediately and offered the guarantee to certain 
subsidiaries of foreign institutions operating within its jurisdiction. Massive 
cross-border flights of deposits from neighbouring countries prompted an 
increase in coverage throughout Europe, in some cases with a formally 
higher coverage threshold, in others (e.g. Germany) with a political 
commitment to unlimited deposits protection (Figure 2.2). State guarantees 
were soon extended also to bank liabilities other than deposits (including 
bonds, interbank deposits, commercial paper).  
More or less the same happened in the United States, where the FDIC 
deposit insurance was temporarily raised from $100,000 to $250,000 and 
                                                      
33 For an analysis of the S&Ls crisis that reaches these conclusions, see Calomiris, 
Klingebiel & Laeven (2005). 
34 Benston & Kaufman (1988) first advocated the need for a system of early 
intervention in the United States, which was then introduced in 1991 by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. See Chapter 4 of this 
report for an in-depth analysis of mandated corrective action with specific focus on 
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guarantees were introduced on certain other bank liabilities. Australia and 
New Zealand also decided to introduce deposit insurance (Schich, 2009).  
In November 2009 the International Association of Deposit Insurers 
and the International Monetary Fund presented a report to the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) on the unwinding of deposit insurance arrangements 
adopted in response to the global financial crisis (IADI & IMF, 2009).  
Figure 2.2 Coverage level of deposit guarantee schemes in selected countries (US $) 
 
Source: Schich (2009). 
Their report shows that 46 jurisdictions have adopted some form of 
enhancement of depositors’ protection: 18 countries introduced full deposit 
guarantees, while 28 raised coverage either permanently or temporarily 
(see Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 Actions adopted to strengthen deposit guarantee schemes 
Full depositor 
guarantees 
Deposit guarantee coverage increase 
 Permanent  Temporary 
Austria Albania Australia 
Denmark Belgium  Brazil 
Germany1 Bulgaria  Netherlands 
Greece1 Croatia  New  Zealand8 
Hong Kong, SAR  Cyprus  Switzerland 
Hungary1 Czech  Republic  Ukraine 
Iceland1 Estonia  United  States4 
Ireland7 Finland   
Jordan Indonesia   
Kuwait3 Latvia   
Malaysia Lithuania  
Mongolia3 Luxembourg   
Portugal1 Kazakhstan2  
Singapore Malta   
Slovakia6 Philippines   
Slovenia3 Poland   
Thailand Romania   
UAE5 Russia  
 Spain   
 Sweden   
 United  Kingdom   
1 Political commitments by government. 
2 Increased from 700,000 to 5 million tenge but will revert to 1 million on 1/1/2012. 
3 Unlimited for banks operating in their jurisdiction. 
4 Unlimited for non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. 
5 Unlimited for local and foreign banks with significant presence in their 
jurisdiction. 
6 Unlimited for all physical persons and some categories of legal persons. 
7 Unlimited for seven specific banks representing 80% of the banking system. 
8 Full coverage up to NZ$1 million per deposit (retail deposits and non-bank 
deposit takers). 
Source: IADI & IMF (2009).  
In the European Union, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 
adopted in 1994 (94/19/EC) had established a minimum level of coverage 
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member states, but at all events excluding interbank deposits. It included 
an option for member states to have co-insurance, with a minimum floor of 
90%. Overall, the Directive did not manage to bring about sufficient 
harmonisation regarding coverage, funding, co-insurance, and who should 
operate the scheme (private agency versus public authority); as a result, 
national systems have remained highly heterogeneous. A largely common 
element is that at least in principle deposit insurance is financed by banks; 
however, the principle is negated by the weakness of funding 
arrangements that make the system credible only for small-size 
interventions. 
Table 2.2 shows the main features of deposit guarantee schemes in 
selected countries as of 2007 (that is, pre-crisis): as may be seen, a majority 
of countries had premiums collected ex-ante (two main exceptions being 
Italy and the United Kingdom); co-insurance was present in less than half 
of the countries; in most cases deposit insurance fees were flat and not risk-
based.  
The European Commission had taken into consideration a review of 
the Deposit Guarantee Directive in the years preceding the 2007-09 crisis, 
but no substantial amendments had been proposed before the crisis struck 
in 2008. On 7 October 2008, the Ecofin Council agreed to raise the minimum 
level of deposit coverage to a minimum of €50,000 and up to €100,000. On 
October 15 the European Commission presented a plan to review Directive 
94/19/EC whose main proposals were: i) to increase minimum coverage 
level to €50,000, and to €100,000 after one year;35 ii) to abandon co-
insurance and iii) to minimise the payout period (from the current three 
months, extendible to nine). These changes were introduced by Directive 
2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009. 
The responsibility for deposit guarantee amongst EU member states 
follows the home country principle: deposits at foreign branches of credit 
institutions headquartered in the member states are covered by the deposit 
guarantee scheme of the home country, while deposits at foreign 
subsidiaries are covered by the deposit guarantee scheme of the host 
country. 
                                                      
35 About 65% of eligible deposits were covered under the previous regime; the new 
levels cover an estimated 80% (with coverage of €50,000) and 90% (with coverage 
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Table 2.2 Main features of deposit guarantee schemes in selected countries (2007) 
 Ex-ante  collection 
of premia 
Co-
insurance 
Risk-based deposit 
insurance fees 
Austria No  No  No 
Belgium Yes  No Yes 
Bulgaria Yes  No No 
Cyprus Yes  No  No 
Czech Republic  Yes  Yes  No 
Denmark Yes  No  No 
Estonia Yes  Yes  No 
Finland Yes  No Yes 
France Yes  No  Yes 
Germany  ex ante and ex post  Yes  No 
Greece Yes  No  No 
Hungary Yes  Yes  Yes 
Iceland Yes  Yes  No 
Ireland Yes  Yes  No 
Italy No  No  Yes 
Latvia Yes  No  No 
Lithuania Yes  Yes  No 
Luxembourg No  No  No 
Malta  ex ante and ex post  Yes  No 
Netherlands No  No  No 
Norway  ex ante and ex post  No  Yes 
Poland  ex ante and ex post  Yes  No 
Portugal Yes  Yes Yes 
Romania Yes  No  Yes 
Slovak Republic  Yes  Yes  No 
Slovenia No  No No 
Spain Yes  No  No 
Sweden Yes  No No 
Switzerland No  No  No 
United 
Kingdom 
No Yes  No 
United States  Yes  No  Yes 
Source: Barth et al. (2008). 
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This allocation of tasks mirrors the division of responsibilities 
between home and host country for prudential supervision,36 whereas the 
consolidated supervision of banking groups is assigned to the home 
country, while the host country only supervises locally chartered 
subsidiaries on a ‘solo’ basis and has very limited oversight on branches 
(on liquidity). Moreover, if the level or scope of the coverage of the host 
country deposit guarantee scheme is higher than that provided by the 
home country, a foreign branch may voluntarily join the host country 
scheme for supplementary guarantee (topping-up). On the other hand, 
when the coverage offered by the home country is higher, an issue of 
competitive disadvantage for institutions chartered in the host country may 
arise.  
This setting leaves host countries exposed to the banking risks that 
may arise from foreign branches and subsidiaries due to a crisis of the 
parent bank, without endowing them with adequate lines of defence. With 
regard to subsidiaries, their soundness critically depends on the home 
country authority responsible for consolidated supervision and on 
confidence in the soundness of the parent bank: thus, the host country 
deposit guarantee fund would have to bear the costs of a bank run on a 
foreign subsidiary, but the host country would face constraints in the 
prevention phase since its supervisory powers are confined to oversight on 
a solo basis.37 Risks may be especially intense for branches with systemic 
relevance in the host country that however represent only a small operation 
for the parent bank and home supervisors: this asymmetry between 
defence instruments and exposure to risk and the misalignment of 
incentives give rise to potential conflicts between the home and host 
country (Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 2006; Herring, 2007). 
                                                      
36 For a detailed analysis of the EU allocation of supervision and deposit guarantee 
tasks to home and host country see Mayes et al. (2007). 
37 A possible solution would be to limit cross-border banking through branches 
and to increase national powers to require ‘subsidiarisation’, as suggested by the 
Turner Review (FSA, 2009a): this solution, however, could compromise the EU 
i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  a n d  w o u l d  a l s o  r e s t r i c t  b a n k s ’  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  t h e i r  
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2.4  The way forward: a European Deposit Guarantee System 
The existing arrangements for deposit guarantee schemes in the European 
Union turned out to be insufficient and ineffective; and there was a 
misalignment between the national nature of deposit guarantee schemes 
and the cross-border dimension of large European banks. The different 
coverage of depositors, depending on the nationality of the bank, creates an 
uneven playing field and gives rise to potential competitive inequality, and 
the topping-up for branches does not appear a sufficient tool to address the 
problem. Besides, as observed by the de Larosière Group (2009), no 
national deposit guarantee scheme would currently be able to make 
reimbursements to depositors of any large EU cross-border financial 
institution without the involvement of public funds. 
The de Larosière report underlined that the lack of sophisticated and 
risk-sensitive funding arrangements “involves a significant risk that 
governments will have to carry the financial burden … for the banks or 
worse, that the deposit guarantee scheme fails on their commitments (both 
of which were illustrated by the Icelandic case)”. Moreover, they 
maintained that reliance on ex-post funding without risk-sensitive 
premiums entails moral hazard and is likely to distort the efficient 
allocation of deposits. 
The rational response is the creation of a European deposit guarantee 
scheme capable of protecting depositors of large pan-European banks 
without creating fresh room for arbitrage or distortions owing to the 
different features of national schemes. A new system should include all the 
elements of well-designed deposit guarantee, as have been described: 
protection limited to retail deposits, ex-ante risk-based financing of the 
deposit guarantee fund and mandated corrective action. All large EU cross-
border banking groups38 should join the new EU scheme, while other banks 
could remain with national protection schemes, if they so wished. The heart 
of the EU system would be a new European Deposit Guarantee Agency 
(EDGA), entrusted with the management of a European Deposit Guarantee 
Fund (EDGF). The EDGA and the EDGF should be established within the 
                                                      
38 Pan-European banking groups might be identified on the basis of a wide range 
of factors, including assets, revenues, net income, deposits, number of branches 
and subsidiaries. 36 | A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE 
 
European Banking Authority; the EU Deposit Guarantee Directive39 and the 
proposed EBA Regulation should thus be amended to incorporate the new 
body and its fund. A network approach – entailing the creation of a 
European System of Deposit Guarantee Schemes, modelled on the 
European System of Central Banks and having the EDGA at its centre – 
would also be an option.  
The EDGF should be pre-funded, with risk-based fees collected by 
the EDGA. Fees should be calculated in a way that ensures the capacity and 
credibility of the fund in protecting depositors of large European banks in 
case of failure. However, the fund should be able to guarantee depositor 
protection in ‘fair weather’, not in a systemic crisis, which instead would 
have to be managed in a coordinated manner by all the components of the 
safety net. The calculation of the fees is the key: risk assessments should 
take into account both the individual risk profile of banks and their 
systemic relevance, as has been described.  
All retail deposits of pan-European banking groups would have to be 
guaranteed under the EU scheme, regardless of their geographical location 
(i.e. including deposits outside the EU). Clearly, pan-European banking 
groups would not have to pay deposit guarantee fees twice, but only at the 
EU level. To avoid distortions and an uneven playing field between pan-
EU and domestic-oriented banking groups, national deposit guarantee 
schemes should be organised on the basis of the same rules of the European 
scheme.  
To ensure the effectiveness and credibility of deposit guarantee, a 
target ratio of the deposit guarantee fund balance in proportion of total 
insured deposits should be established. The target ratio might be chosen on 
the basis of historical data on banking crises and the estimated actuarial 
risk of bank failures. Rather than as a ‘hard’ limit, it might be conceived as 
a ‘safety range’ with fees for participating banks falling when the upper 
range limit is exceeded and rising when the lower range is trespassed. In 
any event, restitution of funds to the participating banks should be 
                                                      
39 Directive 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009 (new Article 12 of Directive 94/19/EC) 
required the Commission to present a report and, if necessary, to put forward 
proposals to amend the Deposit Guarantee Directive in regard of a range of issues 
which include possible models for introducing risk-based contributions. The Joint 
Research Centre (European Commission) published in June 2009 a report on 
possible models for deposit guarantee risk-based contributions (JRC, 2009). OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 37 
 
excluded since this would weaken the fund’s ability to meet a rare crisis of 
a very large bank.  
Another key feature of the proposed EU deposit guarantee system is 
that it should not have power to recapitalise or bail out failing 
institutions.40 Open bank assistance instruments, like those that had been 
assigned in the United States to the FDIC, are not necessary: the assignment 
to EDGA of any of these instruments would be inconsistent with the 
philosophy of the proposed scheme, centred on protecting depositors and 
not financial institutions.41  As a consequence, the revised Deposit 
Guarantee Directive and the EBA Regulation should exclude any role of 
EDGA in the rescue of distressed banks and banking groups, which would 
instead be performed by the new supervisory system as will be described. 
Finally, as has been made clear by the preceding discussion, a deposit 
guarantee scheme not supported by a system of early corrective action 
would be exposed to the risk of regulatory forbearance, so that the fund 
and the guaranteed deposits would not be effectively and credibly 
protected. This is why an EU system of mandated corrective action is 
needed to complete the system: as set out in detail in Chapter 4, the new 
European Banking Authority should have adequate powers to prevent and 
manage the crisis of pan-European banks. 
                                                      
40 Bernet & Walter (2009) identified four possible models for deposit guarantee 
schemes, envisaging increasing powers for the deposit guarantee agency: 1) the 
‘pay box’ model, with functions limited to the payout of covered deposits; 2) the 
“cost reducer’ model, with the task of handling crisis and insolvency of guaranteed 
institutions with the lowest possible cost and externalities for the financial 
intermediation system, also with powers to intervene in the guaranteed banks and 
arrange preventive and corrective measures to protect deposits; 3) the ‘resolution 
facilitator’ model, entailing a proactive support of troubled institutions and 4) the 
‘supervisor’ model, with direct supervisory powers. Our proposal is a mix of the 
pay box and the cost reducer model, since EDGA performs only the payout 
functions, while it is EBA that plays the “cost reducer” role (see Chapter 4).  
41 An alternative proposal envisages the creation of a Resolution/Stabilisation 
Fund, charged with crisis management and resolution, participated by EU member 
states and funded by EU cross-border banks (ABI, 2010). 38 | 
 
 
3.  BANK CRISIS RESOLUTION 
hen serious cracks started to emerge in the financial system, the 
authorities in the main financial centres were taken by surprise 
and reacted somewhat erratically. In some cases, they extended 
government guarantees to some or all creditors; in others, they injected 
capital into the troubled institutions or took them over outright; and in one 
case, Lehman Brothers, they let them go bust. 
This piecemeal approach is bound to magnify the disruptions to the 
financial system and the eventual costs to taxpayers, as well epitomized by 
the Lehman and AIG cases. The chaotic way in which Lehman Brothers 
was placed into bankruptcy led to uncertainty and contagious disruptions 
in financial markets, even if Lehman was not a deposit-taking institution, 
due to great uncertainty on exposures and the probability of recovery. Runs 
developed on money market funds that were believed to be invested in 
Lehman commercial paper, rapidly spilling over to corporate commercial 
paper markets, where liquidity evaporated. Lehman was also a large prime 
broker for many hedge funds, which lost access to their credit lines and 
were forced to liquidate their positions, as well as losing access to their 
collateral placed with Lehman. Bank equity prices fell sharply and the 
interbank markets collapsed.  
The US government took the opposite decision to rescue AIG in order 
to avoid the disruptions that could derive from failure to honour their CDS 
liabilities. The initial financial support was $85 billion, but eventually 
ballooned to almost $200 billion without effectively resolving the 
situation.42 Repeated injections of capital eventually adding up to 
enormous amounts were also a feature of many banking bail-outs in 
                                                      
42 For a detailed review of the measures adopted to stabilize AIG see Baxter (2010).  
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Europe, the prominent examples being the Royal Bank of Scotland and the 
German Hypo Real Estate. 
Thus public authorities seemed caught between a rock and a hard 
place, i.e. disorderly failure with unpredictable consequences on one side, 
and an open-ended injection of public funds on the other. But this is only 
due to the absence of a special resolution procedure for banks, able to 
effectively halt the confidence crisis from spreading and at the same time 
place tight limits on recourse to the public purse. Figure 3.1 shows 
graphically the two unpleasant outcomes together with a third possibility, 
which is superior to both, that is available when adequate resolution 
procedures for banks are in place before crisis strikes.  
Figure 3.1 Fiscal cost and systemic impact in resolution regimes 
 
Source: Čihák & Nier (2009). 
One additional consequence of the decision to let Lehman Brothers go 
bust, as has been mentioned, was that the authorities and analysts fell prey 
to the belief that large financial institutions cannot be allowed to fail. 
However, accepting that some financial institutions cannot fail must be 
wrong, since it entails that those financial institutions effectively operate 
with an open-ended guarantee that governments will intervene to rescue 
them from their mistakes. A financial system in which all the big financial 
institutions are guaranteed by the government entails massive moral 
hazard and is inherently unstable, since the fundamental check on reckless 
behaviour by bankers and financiers, the danger of going bankrupt, would 
be eliminated.  40 | BANK CRISIS RESOLUTION 
 
The correct conclusion should have been that existing resolution tools 
were not adequate to avoid or contain systemic spillovers. A fundamental 
problem in generating destabilising behaviour within the financial system 
was the lack of a credible threat of bankruptcy for its largest institutions. 
Building effective resolution procedures that will enable most, if not all, 
financial institutions to fail without disrupting the financial system 
becomes a key task in the endeavour to build a more stable financial 
system. The Damocles sword of ‘too-big-to-fail’ must be effectively 
removed from the system. 
An effective system to manage banking crises must possess two 
f e a t u r e s :  i t  m u s t  b e  a b l e  t o  k e e p  depositors safe, as well as reassure 
counterparties in the normal running of business on the continuity of basic 
functions – of systemic relevance – of the failing financial institution.  
In this regard, time is of the essence. The forced sale of assets, under 
pressure from vanishing supply of funds, may destroy value beyond what 
is justified by the bank’s capital position. This is why ordinary bankruptcy 
procedures will in general not do: because ordinary procedures, managed 
by courts, are unable to preserve viable relations with the bank’s 
counterparties, since they typically involve a suspension of all claims on the 
bank and aim at protecting all creditors without regard to their relevance 
for the continuing viability of the financial system. Moreover, the formal 
declaration of insolvency – which at some stage is always required by 
general bankruptcy procedures – may hamper, rather than favour, rapid 
redress of troubled financial institutions (Brierley, 2009).  
For this reason it is unavoidable to entrust resolution to special 
administrative procedures managed by banking supervisors, which can 
ensure the continuity of key banking relations while starting to sort out 
counterparties’ positions and the capital effectively available to meet 
emerging losses. Their main purpose, as already mentioned, is to protect 
depositors and key functions with systemic relevance, while all other 
interests at stake are treated with lower priority: which does not mean that 
will be totally sacrificed, only that they will be dealt with in a subsequent 
resolution phase, which may well turn out to provide better value for all 
parties concerned.  
The administrators should be capable of deciding all actions needed 
to recapitalise the bank and restructure its operations without leaving 
much room for shareholders or other creditors to interfere. Should all 
efforts to rescue the bank fail, liquidation procedures should be capable of OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 41 
 
preserving the continuity of fundamental banking relations with depositors 
and other key counterparties of systemic importance. When this happens, 
the performing assets should be conferred to a bridge bank, and the 
impaired assets should remain with the residual bank, to be subsequently 
liquidated. 
3.1  National frameworks for bank crisis resolution  
Most European countries apply ordinary insolvency procedures also to 
banks (lex generalis),43 albeit often with certain adaptations. Corporate 
bankruptcy rules primarily aim at protecting all creditors, typically 
organised in classes of varying priority among which residual values are 
shared in the liquidation process. Many aspects of bank liquidation – such 
as the calculation of assets values, verification of claims, attribution of 
assets – are regulated as in the liquidation of any commercial company.44 
Ordinary bankruptcy proceedings are managed by judges in court 
proceedings; bank supervisors normally have limited control over actions 
taken by the judges and are not entitled to interfere with the aim of 
preserving financial stability. Court-administered procedures must resolve 
creditor claims “in an orderly and fair manner” while respecting par 
condicio creditorum: this principle is in direct conflict with providing 
privileged status to insured depositors.  
General bankruptcy laws give the liquidator exclusive control over 
the assets and liabilities of the failed bank. As noted by Garcia et al. (2009), 
“by the time a court-administered procedure has commenced, judicial 
liquidation of a bank is … much more likely than rehabilitation”. And 
indeed experience has repeatedly shown the potentially disruptive effects 
of applying normal bankruptcy procedures to banking, or bank-like, 
institutions, due to the destabilising effects of depositors and creditors 
trying to protect their claims.  
For this reason, some countries – e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg – had already, prior to the recent crisis, 
introduced special rules into their corporate insolvency law to deal with 
bank insolvency, notably by reserving the right to file for bankruptcy to 
                                                      
43 Hüpkes (2003). 
44 For a clear description of the legal systems, see IMF & World Bank (2009). 42 | BANK CRISIS RESOLUTION 
 
banking supervisors and entrusting them with the management of the 
procedure.  
In particular, in Belgium the Banking, Finance and Insurance 
Commission has the power to appoint a special commissioner whose 
consent is necessary for all acts and decisions taken by the decision-making 
organs within the bank, including the shareholders. All decisions assumed 
without authorisation of the special commissioner are null and void. 
In France, bank liquidation may only be initiated with the opinion of 
the Commission Bancaire and is supervised by the courts. The Commission 
Bancaire appoints an official administrator and may obtain a court order 
for the transfer of bank shares. Liquidation is a proceeding with separate 
liquidators acting respectively under the control of the Commission 
Bancaire and the direction of the courts pursuant to the commercial code. 
In Germany, the bank insolvency proceedings may only be initiated 
by the supervisory agency (BaFin) but are conducted under the corporate 
insolvency law and are overseen by the courts. The legal framework does 
not provide specific restructuring powers for the supervisory agency such 
as purchase-and-assumption transactions or bridge banks to facilitate 
prompt restructuring. A number of simplifications to speed up the 
procedure were approved in 2009, following the Hypo-Re crisis, with the 
Act on the further Stabilisation of the Financial Market45 and the Financial 
Market Stabilisation Fund Act.46 The former has provided for special 
powers to decide the dispossession and transfer of bank shares into public 
ownership; the latter has simplified the procedures for the acquisition of 
shares and risk positions of financial institutions by the Stabilisation Fund 
set up to recapitalise financial institutions. 
Few countries, on the other hand, already have a special 
administrative regime for resolving bank insolvency (lex specialis), notably 
including the United States, with the FDIC resolution powers, and in the 
European Union, Italy and, as a newcomer, the United Kingdom.47 Under 
                                                      
45 Enacted on 20 March 2009. 
46 Adopted on 17 October 2009. 
47 The United Kingdom enacted new legislation introducing special procedures 
once the inadequacy of ordinary bankruptcy rules was exposed by the Northern 
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these regimes the initiative and responsibility for managing the procedure 
belong to the banking supervisors, with an only marginal role of the 
judiciary – typically called upon ex-post to verify that all interested parties 
were treated fairly. 
Under special resolution regimes, the resolution authority gives 
priority to maintaining depositor confidence and financial stability. 
Moreover the minimisation of the public costs of resolution is an explicit 
objective, and for this reason the resolution authority has powers such as 
that of transferring to a ‘bridge bank’ under temporary public ownership 
the par value of insured deposits, and the estimated recovery value of 
uninsured deposits and credit lines. The recent UK legislative banking 
reform was influenced by similar considerations.48  
The involvement of banking supervisors is the key element, because 
authorities that have inspected the bank since the beginning of its activities 
until the crisis may be in the best position to estimate rapidly the recovery 
value of the institution as a whole or in parts. If the bank is to be sold, the 
immediate estimation and allocation of credit losses is of great importance. 
Even in a liquidation, supervisors have an informational advantage about 
the financial condition of the bank and its position as a counterparty to 
contracts with non-depository institutions. 
Under the US procedure, the FDIC has a broad range of options for 
dealing with a bank failure including liquidation, purchase and assumption 
transaction with another institution, establishment of a conservatorship, 
provision of open bank assistance or creation of a bridge bank. A bridge 
bank is a temporary national bank created by the FDIC to take over and 
maintain banking services for the customers of a failed bank (Herring, 2003; 
Bliss & Kaufman 2007). It is designed to fill the gap between the failure of 
the bank and the final resolution. The limit of this procedure is that its 
application is limited to depository, FDIC-insured banks. No special regime 
for bank holding companies and other financial institutions (e.g. 
investment banks, insurance companies) is provided: in the failure of 
                                                      
48 Kaufman (2004) argues that insolvent banks are resolved efficiently when the 
sum of their aggregate credit and liquidity losses is at, or close to, zero; Eisenbeis & 
Kaufman (2006) affirm that the public policy objective of resolving banks should be 
to reduce costs (both public and private) and permit free entry and exit of failed 
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Lehman Brothers, the ordinary discipline for reorganisation (Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code) was applied. Some reforms to the system are now 
considered by the US Congress to create a resolution process that could be 
applied to both banks and non-bank financial institutions, and their 
holding companies.  
In Italy, the ‘special administration’ is normally commenced by the 
Minister for the Economy and Finance, by decree, acting on a proposal 
from the Bank of Italy, and brings the bank under the full control of these 
administrative authorities.49 This procedure applies when serious 
administrative irregularities or violations of laws have lead to sizable 
capital losses. Special administration may last up to one year, and the Bank 
of Italy may propose all the needed restructuring measures, including 
transfer of the bank or part of its assets to another bank. Shareholders are 
deprived of some of their rights but any restructuring operation is normally 
subject to their approval. To the extent that no other solution is found, the 
Ministry for the Economy and Finance, on a proposal from the Bank of 
Italy, can withdraw the license of the bank and start compulsory 
liquidation.  
In the United Kingdom, a new Banking Act was adopted in 2009; a 
Code of Conduct then clarified when the authorities can use their new 
powers and how to deploy them in emergency conditions. Three options 
are envisaged for the troubled bank: i) the Bank of England has the power 
to transfer all or part of a bank (either through a share or business sale) to a 
private sector purchaser;50 ii) the Bank of England can transfer all or part of 
the bank (through a business sale) to a bridge bank owned and operated by 
the Bank of England; and iii) the Treasury can transfer the shares of a bank 
to a nominee or a company wholly owned by the Treasury.51 
                                                      
49 A request to place the bank in special administration may also be addressed by 
the governing board of the bank or an extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders. 
50 It is a purely administrative action; in fact, there is no court involvement and no 
need to wait until a breach of a threshold condition has occurred. In practice it is 
possible for a bank that is still balance sheet solvent to be the subject of the special 
resolution tool. 
51 This tool is meant to be used only if the others tools available to the Bank of 
England have already been fully explored and found not appropriate. In particular 
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In case of partial transfer of assets and liabilities to a commercial 
purchaser or a bridge bank, some assets and liabilities will remain with the 
‘residual bank’ under administration. The procedure will try to rescue the 
residual bank as a going concern or, at any event, to achieve the best 
feasible outcome for creditors. The Bank of England plays the central role 
in the procedure since its agreement must be obtained by the administrator 
in the decisions to set up the residual bank – performing de facto the 
functions played in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings by the committee of 
creditors.  
In case of insolvency, a special court-based liquidation develops 
whose primary objective is to ensure that depositors with eligible claims 
under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) are paid 
promptly. The Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury are all entitled to 
ask the court for a bank insolvency order; if the court finds that appropriate 
conditions are verified,52 she will issue a winding up order and appoint a 
liquidator. This procedure is only available for banks that have depositors 
with claims eligible for compensation from the FSCS.  
As has been described, while some countries have a specific 
resolution regime for banks, others apply the ordinary corporate 
insolvency law. An effective cross-border resolution is all but impossible if 
the tools available under national law are not only different, but also 
mutually incompatible. For example if in one country an administrative 
authority has the power to transfer assets to a private buyer, while this is 
forbidden in a second country where only a judge could authorise it, a 
prompt common intervention by those two authorities to deal with 
affiliated banks in their jurisdictions just cannot happen.  
As a consequence of their heterogeneous legal frameworks, in the 
recent crisis countries have tried to ring-fence national assets of cross-
border groups and have applied national resolution measures at national 
level, rather than look for group solution. Ring-fencing local assets within a 
cross-border group may amplify the problem, rather than resolve it. The 
                                                                                                                                       
it can only be used to protect the public interest and resolve or reduce a serious 
threat to the stability of the financial system. 
52 Ground A: a bank is unable, or likely to become unable, to pay its debts; ground 
B: a winding up would be in the public interest; ground C: the winding up would 
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incentives for the states to coordinate and renounce to ring-fencing are 
strongly limited by their legal duty to protect the national stakeholders’ 
interests (see Box 3.1 below on ring-fencing). 
Box 3.1 Ring-fencing in bank crisis resolution 
It is by now a commonplace that banks grow internationally but die 
nationally. Inter-country cooperation between financial supervisors 
deteriorates rapidly in crisis conditions, basically owing to incentive conflicts 
between national authorities, which typically try to protect home operators, 
often at the expense of creditors and stakeholders in the countries hosting 
the foreign branches and subsidiaries of the banking group.* 
In this context, countries willing to host large foreign banking groups 
tend to require them to obtain a separate banking license in the country and 
set up a separate legal entity, a subsidiary, with adequate own capital and 
subject to full supervision by the host country. Should the parent company 
threaten to become insolvent, the natural response of local authorities is to 
try to ‘ring- fence’ local operations and, if need be, seize local assets of the 
bank in order to protect its local creditors and other stakeholders. The Fortis 
collapse provides a clear example.  
On the positive side, the working group of the Committee of Basel 
Supervisors on Cross-Border Bank Resolution (CBRG) in its 2009 Report 
(BCBS, 2009b) has noted that effective ring-fencing and a territorial approach 
to crisis resolution can facilitate early corrective action by local authorities 
and ensure that local assets of the local branch exceed local liabilities. 
Moreover, the danger of separate resolution under local control puts 
pressure on the home jurisdiction of the parent company to share 
information and tackle decisively the problems besetting the institution. 
Ring-fencing can also contribute to the resiliency of the separate operations 
within host countries by encouraging the separate functionality of the local 
operating branch. Ring-fencing has occurred even where there were 
agreements between national jurisdictions providing for the allocation of 
responsibility for deposit insurance. For the host jurisdictions, ring-fencing is 
also attractive since it allows greater control on capital, liquidity and risk 
management of locally established banks; however, this kind of control can 
also impose costs on the host jurisdiction if cross-border institutions limit or 
reduce their operations in that country as a result.  
More generally, the host-country authorities will have great difficulties 
in obtaining full information on the conditions of the parent bank from the 
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avoid the collapse of the local subsidiary and may well lead to a worse 
outcome for local creditors; it may also complicate the efforts to resolve the 
bank crisis short of liquidation (Krimminger, 2005), locally and for the whole 
group.  
The parent bank and the home-country authorities, on their part, may 
be concerned by the potentially adverse repercussions of ring-fencing in a 
crisis, with local losses spilling over to endanger the entire group. Indeed, 
ring-fencing can also aggravate the difficulties of the group as a whole 
because of the resulting segregation of internal funding and liquidity flows. 
It may hamper orderly resolution by the home authorities on a consolidated 
basis by reducing the pool of assets available for intra-group transfer in 
order to meet emerging losses. 
T h e  r e c e n t  c r i s i s  h a s  a l s o  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  i n  a  p e r i o d  o f  m a r k e t  
instability there is little time to bring about cooperative cross-border 
agreements in managing bank crises. One noteworthy exception has been 
the agreement brokered by the IMF, together with the European 
Commission, between some Eastern European countries and major foreign 
banking groups active in those countries to recapitalise their subsidiaries 
and maintain credit flows. Significantly, capital requirements were 
determined with reference to local deposit collection.** 
In general, lacking an agreement between home and host jurisdictions 
on burden-sharing in case of crisis and resolution, national authorities are 
likely to fall back to territorial “ring-fenced” resolution. And indeed many 
national supervisors, notably including the British FSA, are making explicit 
their intention to do just that. The Basel CBRG has recommended a “middle 
ground” approach envisaging ring-fencing of systemically important 
functions performed by the bank, rather than the local legal entities. In their 
view this approach would limit moral hazard and promote market discipline 
by shifting a greater share of losses onto shareholders and other creditors. In 
fact, as noted by Hüpkes (2004), ring-fencing can operate as a particular form 
of detachment or ex-post separation of certain functions, regardless of their 
placement in branches or subsidiaries. This approach would require 
appropriate changes to national laws so as to facilitate continuity of key 
financial functions across nations. 
_____________________ 
* For a clear description of the agency problem, see Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2006). 
** See for example European Commission & IMF (2009). 
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3.2  Ingredients of an effective resolution regime 
It is now broadly agreed that in order to preserve financial stability and 
minimise the cost of bank crises, all countries should establish effective 
resolution procedures and that these procedures should be managed by 
banking supervisory authorities endowed with special powers rather than 
by judges in court. Special problems arise for cross-border banking groups 
that require supranational arrangements. 
In their recent report (BCBS, 2009b), the special working group of the 
Committee of Basel Supervisors on cross-border bank resolution has listed 
the key ingredients that all resolution procedures should possess at 
national level in order to be effective. They notably include adequate 
administrative powers to deal with all types of financial institutions in 
difficulties (for a review of the main tools, see Box 3.2). National resolution 
authorities should also have legal authority to delay temporarily the 
operation of contractual termination clauses in order to complete the 
transfer of the contract to other entities or promote the continuity of market 
functions. And they are encouraged more in general to use risk mitigation 
techniques to enhance the resiliency of critical financial or market 
functions, e.g. enforceable netting arrangements, collateralisation and 
segregation of client positions. This end would be notably helped by 
encouraging the migration of derivative contracts to organised clearing 
platforms with central counterparty. 
The Basel Supervisors also recommend the creation of a national 
framework to coordinate the resolution of legal entities of financial groups 
and financial conglomerates within each jurisdiction. The absence of a 
procedure for the coordinated resolution of the companies in a financial 
group limits the possibilities available to national authorities for crisis 
management and poses limits to the possible coordinated resolution of 
such cross-border groups. While other issues, such as the lack of time or 
inadequate information, may render any reorganising process complex, the 
absence of a coordinated resolution mechanism for the firms in financial 
groups may mean that the only alternative is a disorderly collapse or a bail-
out.  
In this connection, the Basel working group refers to the 
recommendations developed by UNCITRAL for the improvement of 
national group insolvency proceedings (to be finally adopted in 2010), 
which include the possibility of joint application and procedural 
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group guarantees after insolvency proceedings have commenced, 
appointment of a single administrator, implementation of a joint 
reorganisation plan, extension of liability, or substantive consolidation 
(pooling of assets).53 
Two further recommendations concern the reduction of complexity 
and advance planning for orderly resolution by the banks or financial 
conglomerate themselves. It is recommended that supervisors work closely 
with the management of financial groups to understand how group 
structures would be resolved in a crisis and, when they believe that these 
structures are too complex to permit an orderly resolution, they should 
encourage a reduction in complexity through regulatory and prudential 
requirements. In addition, all institutions of systemic relevance should be 
required to draw a contingency plan, “proportionate to the size and 
complexity of the institution”, to facilitate the rapid resolution or winding 
down in case of need. Such contingency plans should become a regular 
component of supervisory oversight.  
Quite a few supervisory authorities and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB, 2009) have now specifically endorsed these recommendations, which 
are likely to be adopted in the coming months. While they remain 
controversial within the financial community, they clearly offer a better 
alternative to straight regulatory interventions to modify the structure of 
financial conglomerates, as some governments are now starting to see as 
the sole viable solution.  
Specific recommendations concern the supranational coordination of 
resolution proceedings. First of all, it is necessary that the different national 
authorities develop a clear understanding of respective responsibilities for 
supervision, liquidity provision, crisis management and resolution. They 
are encouraged to develop arrangements that allow for the timely and 
effective sharing of information both during the normal course of 
supervisory activities and on the occasion of crises. The Basel CBRG also 
recommends that, in order to promote better coordination among national 
authorities in cross-border resolutions, national authorities should consider 
                                                      
53 For a clear and complete description of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
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the development of procedures to facilitate the mutual recognition of crisis 
management and resolution measures.54 
While representing considerable progress relative to the present 
situation, these recommendations do not resolve the critical issue of unitary 
management of resolution procedures for cross-border banks and financial 
conglomerates.  
Box 3.2 Special resolution tools  
Acquisition by a private sector purchaser. When a financial institution is under 
stress, the desirable solution often is the sale of the institution as a whole to a 
strong private purchaser, ensuring continuity of services and ample 
protection of the interests of creditors and counterparties. To this end, the 
resolution authority needs to have power to conclude a private sale without 
the consent of shareholders, even if the sale conditions entail losses for them.  
Assisted sale to a private sector purchaser. If the assets of the bank are 
difficult to value, the authorities can assist with a guarantee to the purchaser. 
Such a guarantee does not extend to shareholders or creditors, and therefore 
reduces moral hazard and preserves incentives for prudent risk 
management.  
Bridge bank. The bank is split in two parts: a new licensed bank under 
the control of the banking authority to carry on the performing assets, 
including some or all of the deposits and other liabilities. The impaired 
assets and remaining portion of liabilities stay with the residual bank, which 
is subsequently closed and liquidated. If reorganisation of the bank fails, this 
technique allows operations to continue in the bridge bank, while the 
residual bank can be stripped of its charter and liquidated.   
Partial transfer of assets, deposits and liabilities to a ‘good bank’. When 
some of the bank’s assets are doubtful, non-performing or difficult to value 
and it is difficult to find a buyer, the authority needs to have power to split 
the institution into two parts: a good part within easy-to-value or ‘clean’ 
assets and deposits, and a residual institution that will keep in its books all 
of the assets difficult to value or illiquid.  
                                                      
54 UNCITRAL has adopted, on 1 July 2009, a Practice Guide on Cross-Border 
Insolvency Cooperation (UNCITRAL, 2009). The aim of the Guide is not to give 
any recommendation but to provide judges and stakeholders with information on 
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Temporary public control. As a last remedy, the government should 
have the power to take temporary public control (nationalisation) of the 
failing institution. This tool may be most appropriate where a significant 
amount of public funds are necessary to stabilise the failing institution, for 
example if the banking system is highly concentrated and there are few 
possibilities for a sale to a private purchaser. 
Specific tools for banks’ systemic functions.* Banks and financial 
institutions perform some key systemic functions whose interruption might 
impair the good functioning of the financial system and eventually 
undermine financial stability. For this reason systemically relevant functions 
deserve particular protection. The preservation of their integrity and 
continuity can be obtained through the following specific tools:  
a.  the  replacement of the failing institution as provider of systemically 
relevant functions to other financial intermediaries can reduce the impact 
of failure. The possibility to find an alternative provider depends on the 
nature of the function; it can work effectively for trading in securities, 
foreign exchange, money market instruments and deposit-taking. To find 
a replacement, one must consider the availability of alternative suppliers 
and the necessary infrastructure to exercise the function;  
b.  the detachment of systemically relevant functions consists of insulating the 
function from the winding down and permitting the performance of the 
function without disruption. The feasibility of detachment will depend on 
a number of factors, such as separability and transferability of the 
function and legal certainty. To facilitate resort to this tool, the authorities 
must consider developing contingency plans, including functions ring-
fencing, which may help in realising the scope of this instrument by 
attaching strict conditions previously accepted by creditors. A statutory 
procedure to realise the detachment is the bridge bank;  
c.  the immunisation of the systemically relevant functions from failure may 
be achieved by collateralisation of counterparty claims, netting by 
reducing counterparty exposures from gross amounts to net values, 
carve-outs by statutory law or contractual agreements from insolvency 
law, and market structure measures providing strict rules of antitrust. 
Collateralisation and netting are commonly used to strengthen the 
financial infrastructure, such as the payments, clearing and settlement 
systems. A certain degree of immunisation can be achieved through 
statutory and contractual mechanisms. 
_____________________ 
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3.3  Legal hurdles in special resolution regimes 
A critical feature in a special resolution regime is the balancing of the wide 
public interest to a solution that minimises systemic damage with the 
interests of private shareholders. Under existing legal systems, 
shareholders are only liable for any of the debts of the company up to the 
value of their capital stake. However, even when capital is largely or 
wholly depleted, their property rights confer upon them the right of 
ordinary and extraordinary decisions on company operations and 
activities. Special protections of property rights may be present in legal and 
even constitutional rules. Therefore, care is needed to ensure that actions 
that may be adopted under special resolution procedures either do not 
infringe these shareholders’ rights or do so under appropriate exemptions 
from existing legal arrangements (Box 3.3). 
Box 3.3 Possible limitations of shareholders’ rights* 
Pre-packaged resolution. Authorities could require financial institutions to 
come to a private solution, instead of using their statutory resolution 
powers. Such agreements could set out contingency plans for circumstances 
in which the institution becomes financially troubled, including 
reorganisation measures, and a corporate structure that would facilitate a 
wind-down. For example, the bank’s shareholders could approve a 
resolution giving the board power to bring in new investors rapidly without 
their approval. This option could be especially valuable for complex group 
structures in a cross-border context. The pre-packaged resolution would of 
course need to be drawn up in consultation with all relevant national 
s u p e r v i s o r s .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  s u c h  c o n t r a c t u a l  
arrangements can only be effective for early resolution, for afterwards they 
could be superseded by action under the insolvency law. For this reason, a 
pre-packaged solution is not a substitute for a statutory resolution regime. 
Layering bank liabilities. An appropriate structuring of banks’ 
liabilities would also facilitate private resolution of bank crises, and make 
the creation of a bridge bank workable. One suggestion that should be 
considered in this context is to require banks to issue minimum proportions 
to own capital of subordinated debt, convertible into equity when capital 
falls below or the CDS spread rises above certain pre-defined thresholds 
(Calomiris, 2000; Kay, 2009). The rationale is straightforward: the market 
will place a price on these issues that will be based on the estimated 
probability of conversion; and conversion will mean that bond-holders will 
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insolvent, and shareholders will be diluted. Therefore, bond-holders would 
have a strong incentive to monitor the bank managers; and the latter would 
have a strong incentive to manage prudently, so as to obtain a low interest 
on their convertible bonds. Market discipline would thereby be 
strengthened. Achim Dübel has suggested that in general a tiered structure 
of bank (subordinated) liabilities would in practice be equivalent to pre-
packaged resolution.    
Temporary suspension of shareholders’ rights.  A temporary 
suspension of shareholders’ rights to decide changes in the bank’s capital 
structure could be provided by law in order to favour quick resolution of 
bank crises. A good example are the rules introduced in Germany in 2009 
permitting to raise equity capital without a shareholder resolution and 
excluding subscription by existing shareholders. 
Shareholders’ divestiture. An extreme measure, provided by law, 
could be the total divestiture of shareholders in case of certain conditions. 
The bank and all its assets would be transferred to a trustee or receiver. This 
procedure would be a form of compulsory administration that ends the 
existence of the firm as a legal entity and extinguishes the shareholders’ 
rights. However, if the bank still has positive net worth, shareholders should 
be paid an adequate compensation, which could consist of a monetary 
payment or take other forms that would give the former shareholders a 
claim on the future earnings of the bank.  
_____________________ 
Source: Hüpkes (2009a). 
In fair weather the room for conflict between the shareholders’ 
interest in increasing the value of their shares and the depositors’ interest in 
making sure that their money is safe, typically is small – and in the main is 
t a k e n  c a r e  o f  b y  p r u d e n t i a l  r u l e s .  Conversely, in a crisis situation, 
shareholders’ interests may be in sharp contrast with those of depositors 
and the wider public. For instance, while depositors may want substantial 
injections of fresh capital, this would dilute shareholders, who are likely to 
resist. Actions needed to preserve the continuity of critical functions of an 
insolvent bank may well prejudice shareholders’ interest in maintaining the 
unity of the business. If decisions are subject to the approval of 
shareholders, the needed actions may never be undertaken, to the greater 
damage of depositors and financial stability at large.  
For this reason, many national resolution regimes contain provisions 
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level of intrusiveness. Some suspend certain governance rights for a limited 
period, others have a deeper impact on shareholders.  
For instance, in Belgium, the Banking, Finance and Insurance 
Commission can nominate a special inspector with extended powers to act. 
In France, the temporary administrator has full powers to administer and 
represent the institution. The German supervisory authority may suspend 
current management and appoint a temporary administrator but this leaves 
shareholder rights nearly unchanged. In Italy, when special administration 
is started the functions of the general meeting of shareholders are 
suspended. 
In all these cases, the decisions relating to the capital structure remain 
within the competence of the shareholder meeting and require their 
support. As a consequence, restructuring measures would always need to 
be negotiated with shareholders. The notable exception is in the new UK 
Banking Act, which empowers the authorities to act without the consent of 
the shareholders.  
The content and scope of shareholder rights depend on legal 
traditions. Shareholder rights are more strongly founded in civil law in 
Europe than the US. US law requires the general meeting to approve only 
some decisions and leaves the division of powers up to the company; as a 
consequence, the board holds all powers that are not explicitly reserved to 
shareholders.  
Under corporate law in most European countries, the shareholder 
meeting has all the powers not attributed by law to the board. Usually the 
firm charter or a shareholder resolution cannot assign to the board powers 
that are attributed to the shareholder meeting by the law. Shareholders 
must vote on various decisions relevant for crisis resolution, such as spin-
offs and divisions, the increase or decrease of company capital, and the 
waiver of pre-emptive rights associated with an increase in capital funded 
by outside investors. 
The hurdles created by this approach came into sharp evidence in the 
Fortis case, when Belgian shareholders objected to the government’s 
decision to sell the group’s activities to BNP Paribas and brought the case 
before the Belgian Commercial Court, maintaining that the sale required 
shareholder approval even if it had already been decided by contract. The 
Court of First Instance ruled that approval by shareholders was 
unnecessary; but the Court of Appeal decided the opposite and ordered a 
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which was then renegotiated with the Belgian State and BNP, and was 
approved by a subsequent new meeting of shareholders.  
Quite the opposite happened in the United States when Bear Stearns 
was acquired by JPMorgan Chase, and the structure of the contract 
explicitly excluded refusal by shareholders. In the AIG case the 
government was handed preferred stock issued without shareholder 
agreement under the New York Stock Exchange’s Shareholder Approval 
Policy.55  
The Commission Communication on Crisis Management in the 
Banking Sector (European Commission, 2009) explicitly raises the 
possibility of adjusting Company Law Directives to balance shareholder 
rights with public interest so as to facilitate speedy interventions by the 
authorities to restructure a failing institution. The Second Company Law 
Directive (77/91/EEC) contains provisions mandating shareholder 
approval for any increase or reduction of capital as well as rules on 
shareholder pre-emption rights, which indeed may hinder or impede 
administrative resolution of an ailing bank. The Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive (2007/36/EC) requires long leads for calling shareholder 
meetings which may slow down resolution decisions.  
Another potential obstacle for effective administrative resolution of a 
failing bank is represented by legal actions by affected parties against the 
banking authorities’ measures. Decisions taken by the banking authorities 
in the framework of insolvency proceedings are often challenged in court 
by shareholders or creditors, notably regarding the decision to commence 
insolvency proceedings or specific actions undertaken during the 
proceedings that may prejudge some interests. Even if banking authorities 
must be accountable for their actions, and the affected parties need to be 
legally protected, it is important to ensure that such actions do not 
undermine the efficiency of the insolvency procedures of the bank. 
Accordingly, the legal framework must specify the circumstances in which 
such challenges are legitimate and the remedies that affected parties may 
seek, in view of the need to preserve the certainty and credibility of the 
banking authorities’ decisions.  
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Legal action against decisions in insolvency proceedings may actually 
consist of: i) judicial review of the banking authorities’ actions assumed in 
the context of insolvency procedures and ii) legal action to obtain 
compensation from the banking authorities or their representatives, for 
damage caused by specific measures in the context of insolvency 
proceedings.  
Judicial review of the banking authorities’ decisions. In most 
countries the administrative law provides for court review of the measures 
taken by an administrative authority. The court will overturn their decision 
when the action is found to have exceeded legal authority. It is important to 
specify that the courts should not be able to stop resolution by the 
administrative authorities, but only review the legality of the procedure 
post factum. The review should not extend to the use of discretionary 
powers, except in case of manifestly gross mistake or abuse of power. In 
general, the court should not be allowed to substitute its own views for 
those of the administrative authority charged with managing the 
procedure.  
 Court reviews should be conducted rapidly and should not block the 
resolution proceedings. Where the actions of the banking authorities inflict 
damages on shareholders or other interested parties without adequate 
justification and it is impossible to restore the previous situation, the only 
effective remedy is compensation for damage; but legal rules may even 
allow for a close circumscription of the circumstances in which damages 
may be awarded.  
Actions for damages against the banking authorities. Parties affected 
by the actions of the banking authorities in insolvency proceedings may 
also file a lawsuit for damages resulting directly from the banking 
authorities’ behaviour, as a consequence of ‘improper’ conduct in 
exercising their powers. Most countries limit this kind of liability only to 
cases of negligence or bad faith. Again, a clear legal framework in such 
cases is essential for the effective functioning of resolution procedures.   
3.4  European legal instruments for cross-border banking groups  
The introduction of special resolution regimes based on common principles 
in all the member states, as advocated by BIS supervisors and as has been 
described, would greatly improve the situation but would not suffice for 
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need for a special framework applicable to large cross-border financial 
institutions.  
Large cross-border financial institutions are typically organised as 
groups with branches and subsidiaries, often with very complex 
structures.56 The parent can be itself an operating firm or a holding 
company. Branches are not separate legal entities but simply operative 
extensions of the parent bank, which remains fully responsible for their 
liabilities. Subsidiaries, on the other hand, are separate legal entities with 
their own capital and company organisation. They are connected to the 
head company through complex ownership structures, which determine 
how the different entities are run and who is responsible for their liabilities; 
often, they are also connected to the head company and other entities in the 
group by myriad credit and other business relations.57 
The main issue here arises from the fact that legal structures – which 
are decided for legal, accounting, tax and other considerations – often do 
not reflect the real functional organisation and decision-taking (Hüpkes, 
2009b). Typically, IT systems, liquidity management, risk control and other 
key functions are fully centralised: centralisation and integration of key 
functions bring considerable benefits but may blur the understanding on 
the part of the board, auditors and market analysts of the group’s actual 
risk and financial position. For this reason, sometimes host countries 
impose burdensome restrictions on branches because of their limited power 
over them in supervision and crisis resolution (Cerutti et al., 2005). 
Thus, the real problem of large cross-border financial institutions is 
their complexity and lack of correspondence of legal and functional 
structures. Both factors greatly complicate the allocation of assets and 
losses in a crisis and make it close to impossible to implement a quick and 
orderly reorganisation or wind-down. 
There are two approaches to managing the crisis of a cross-border 
financial institution with subsidiaries and branches in different 
jurisdictions: the universal and the territorial approach.  
                                                      
56 See Herring & Carmassi (2010) for a detailed analysis of corporate structures of 
large and complex financial institutions and the implications for financial stability. 
57 Lehman Brothers was composed by more than 2,000 separate legal entities with 
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Under the universal approach, the resolution is based on the law of 
the country where the insolvent institution has its parent firm. The 
decisions of the resolution authority in the principal jurisdiction are 
applied to all the companies of the insolvent group, including those located 
in foreign jurisdictions.  
Under the territorial approach each country applies its own law to 
companies placed in its jurisdiction so that each insolvent branch or 
subsidiary is governed by local insolvency law. It requires a declaration of 
insolvency in each country where the insolvent firm maintains operating 
units. 
Within the European Union, the Directive 2001/24/EC58 embraces 
the principle of universality for branches but not subsidiaries. Moreover, 
the directive does not try to harmonise national legislation on 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. It establishes that any 
reorganisation or winding up of a credit institution with branches in 
different states must be initiated and carried out under a single procedure, 
by the competent authority of the home country of the parent company, 
and that the effects of these measures must be mutually recognised. 
Subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions are not covered by the directive. 
Moreover the directive contains a number of conflict-of-law rules 
applicable to set-offs, property rights, netting and repurchase agreements.59 
                                                      
58 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
reorganisation and winding up for credit institutions. 
59 In particular, under Article 10(2)(c), the law of the home member state shall 
determine the conditions under which set-offs may be invoked. Under Article 23 of 
the Directive “the adoption of reorganisation measures or the opening of winding 
up proceedings shall not affect the right of creditors to demand the set-off of their 
claims against the claims of the credit institution, where such a set-off is permitted 
by the law applicable to the credit institution's claim”. This provision “shall not 
preclude the actions for voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts 
detrimental to all creditors”. Article 24 of the Directive establishes that “the 
enforcement of proprietary rights in instruments or other rights in such 
instruments the existence or transfer of which presupposes their recording in a 
register, an account or a centralized deposit system held or located in a Member 
State shall be governed by the law of the Member State where the register, account, 
or centralized deposit system in which those rights are recorded is held or 
located”. Article 25 provides that “netting agreements shall be governed solely by 
the law of the contract which governs such agreements”. Without prejudice to the 
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Finally the Winding Up Directive provides procedural rules only with 
reference to each legal entity within a cross-border banking group.   
This limited field of application does not take into account synergies 
within a group which may be in the interest of creditors in case of 
restructuring. A group-based approach to winding up and reorganisation 
can foster survival of subsidiaries and even the entire group by facilitating 
asset transfers and the unitary resolution of claims and counterparty 
positions.60  
However, subsidiaries constitute the principal legal form of European 
cross-border banks, holding assets of almost €4.6 trillion; subsidiaries of 
third countries’ credit institutions in Europe hold assets of about €1.3 
trillion (ECB, 2010). In the absence of a group-based EU legal framework, 
their crises would be managed locally under host country law, even if in 
reality those subsidiaries are not self-standing autonomous units. As a 
consequence, host countries intervene to impose capital and other 
requirements on the subsidiaries under their control: but these measures 
would not preserve the subsidiaries from failure, should the parent 
company go under. The perception that their destiny depends on the 
parent company would thus make it impossible for the host country to 
impede a confidence crisis, or a run on its banks, as a result of events 
unfolding out of its jurisdiction and effective control. 
                                                                                                                                       
above-referenced Article 24, “repurchase agreements shall be governed solely by 
the law of the contract which governs such agreements” (Article 26), and 
“transactions carried out in the context of a regulated market shall be governed 
solely by the law of the contract which governs such transactions”(Article 27). The 
provisions about set-off and netting should be read in conjunction with Articles 1, 
2 and 7 of Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements (Financial Collateral Directive), 
which requires member states to ensure that a close-out netting provision of a 
financial collateral arrangement (or an arrangement of which a financial collateral 
arrangement forms part) to which, inter alia, a credit institution is party can take 
effect in accordance with its terms notwithstanding the commencement or 
continuation of winding up proceedings or reorganisation measures in respect of 
the credit institution. 
60 Very few countries (e.g. Italy) have specific rules for reorganisation and winding 
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3.5  A new EU framework for reorganisation of cross-border 
banking groups  
The reorganisation of a cross-border banking group involves the 
application of resolution measures to group entities located in different 
jurisdictions. To realise a group-based approach, a common framework for 
coordinated action by the national authorities is needed, based not only on 
common tools in the member states but also agreed principles for the 
coordination of all actors and actions affecting the financial group (Hüpkes, 
2009c).61  
In principle, such a European solution can take two forms: fully 
consolidated resolution for all the entities in a group by the authority of the 
home country of the parent company, with appropriate arrangements for 
the delegation of powers by the countries hosting subsidiaries; or a fully 
centralised procedure under new legal powers entrusted to a new body 
created by EU legislation. We will argue that the best way to go is a 
pragmatic combination of elements of the two approaches, keeping to a 
minimum required changes in existing arrangements and building upon 
the recent Commission proposal for the reform of supervision. 
In their recent consultation paper on the issue, the European 
Commission has recognised the need for a common framework “that will 
in future enable authorities to stabilize and control the systemic impact of 
failing cross-border institutions” (European Commission, 2009), but has not 
indicated which way to go. It has however put forth some common 
principles that broadly follow those of the BIS supervisors. In particular, it 
has stressed the need for all national supervisors to have adequate tools to 
identify problems in banks at a sufficiently early stage and intervene 
decisively to restore the health of the institution or wind it down. It has also 
underlined the importance of limiting the fall-out from failure of a cross-
border bank on other banks and the financial system as a whole, among 
other things by finding solutions to the inconsistencies arising from 
territorial- separate entity approach to insolvency. And it has advocated the 
                                                      
61 For a proposal of a collegial approach to bank resolution, see Mayes et al. (2007) 
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establishment of appropriate arrangements to share the fiscal cost of 
resolution.62 
In fact, all the elements of a solution at the EU level are there; they 
o n l y  n e e d  t o  b e  p i c k e d  u p  a n d  b r ought together. As already explained 
crisis prevention, reorganisation and liquidation would all be part of a 
resolution procedure managed for each banking group in all countries by 
the parent administrative authority with adequate powers.  
The first step of resolution should be early mandated action by bank 
supervisors ensuring that, as capital falls below certain thresholds, the bank 
or banking group will be promptly and adequately recapitalised (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). If capital continues to fall national supervisors 
should have the power to intervene and impose reorganisation measures. 
While full harmonisation of national laws is clearly not feasible, a 
revised Reorganisation and Winding Up (framework) Directive could 
require the member states to adapt their legal system by introducing the 
required common resolution tools and resolving the legal hurdles that have 
been described (Box 3.2).63  
Moreover, as recommended even by the Basel Supervisors (BCBS, 
2009b), the new Directive should require the member states to establish a 
national framework for the resolution of legal entities of financial groups 
and financial conglomerates within each jurisdiction. The absence of a 
coordinated resolution mechanism for firms that are part of financial 
groups may entail that the only alternative is a disorderly collapse or a bail-
out.64 In this connection, policy-makers should take into consideration the 
                                                      
62 The Commission staff working document, accompanying the Communication on 
the cross-border crisis-management in banking sector, focuses on the impact 
assessment and takes into consideration all the aspects of these problems. 
63 For the introduction of “A resolution mechanism for financial institutions”, see 
also the Recommendation 16 of “Financial Reform. A framework for financial 
stability” by the Group of Thirty (G-30, 2009). 
64 Italian legislation already contains a definition of banking group; in particular 
Article 60 of the 1993 Banking Law provides: “A banking group shall be composed 
of either of the following: a) an Italian parent bank and the banking, financial and 
instrumental companies it controls; b) an Italian parent financial company and the 
banking, financial and instrumental companies it controls, where such companies 
include at least one bank and the banking and financial companies are of decisive 
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recommendations developed by UNCITRAL for the improvement of 
national group insolvency proceedings.65 
In this spirit, a further modification of the Winding Up Directive 
should extend the ‘universal’ principle of resolution of cross-border 
banking groups not only to branches, but also subsidiaries that, besides not 
enjoying managerial autonomy, cannot effectively stand alone in case of 
default. Full universality across both branches and subsidiaries would 
better reflect the reality of integrated businesses; it would correspond to the 
already established principle of consolidated group supervision; it is 
essential in order to create an integrated system of deposit guarantee and 
mandated action for reorganisation and winding up.66 
The key principle is that subsidiaries that do not constitute 
autonomous entities, and therefore could not overcome on their own the 
failure of the parent bank, should be treated as branches when the 
institution has to be rescued under the EU system of mandated corrective 
action or dissolved. In other words, subsidiaries that are de facto branches 
should be treated as such also in case of insolvency, as they are in the 
normal conduct of business of the bank when things go well. Separate 
resolution of subsidiaries would only be allowed to the extent that they 
would be really independent of the parent company, would be unaffected 
by the group’s liquidation and would not cause danger to the group’s 
survival in case the subsidiary were wound up. In this way, economic 
function and legal form could be reconciled; the incentives to maintain and 
operate a complex structure without functional justification would be 
greatly reduced.  
                                                                                                                                       
importance, as established by the Bank of Italy in compliance with the resolutions 
of the Credit Committee.”   
65 See Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.2. 
66 Garcia et al. (2009) consider that it would also be necessary to agree on a 
common definition of insolvency. While this would obviously be of help to mark 
the beginning of liquidation, it is not always strictly necessary under a system – 
like the one existing in Italy – whereby the administrative resolution authority 
doesn’t need to formalize the existence of a situation of insolvency in order to 
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3.6  A new EU liquidation framework for cross-border banking 
groups 
Consistent with the framework that has been developed for the resolution 
of cross-border banking groups within the EU, when the reorganisation of 
the bank or group in crisis fails, a bridge bank should be created to ensure 
continuity of ‘sound’ banking operations. In that precise moment the 
residual bank, stripped of its banking charter, should enter liquidation; 
from that moment onwards all residual rights of creditors and shareholders 
may be claimed only against the residual bank – whose assets will include 
the price paid for the assets transferred to the bridge bank. An 
administrator, appointed by the banking supervisors in charge of the 
reorganisation, should then take full legal control of the residual bank and 
manage the liquidation in front of eligible national courts, in accordance 
with the principle of equal treatment and applicable rules on claim priority.   
In order to implement these principles, it is necessary to amend the 
Winding Up Directive to include the procedures for the creation of the 
bridge bank and hence the start of liquidation, the criteria and safeguards 
for the transfer of assets and claims to the bridge bank, the immediate 
withdrawal of the banking licence for the residual bank, and the duties of 
the administrator in charge of the liquidation. The administrator should be 
appointed by the EBA based on a proposal by the College of supervisors. 
The primary purpose of the liquidation would be to preserve and 
optimise the residual bank assets for the satisfaction of creditors, and 
residual claims by shareholders. Accordingly, the liquidation discipline 
should include rules for: a suspension of all the claims against the bank 
(‘moratorium’); the sale of the assets in an orderly and cost-effective 
manner; the distribution of the income to the various classes of creditors in 
an equitable and transparent manner, in respect of their priority; the 
immediate enforceability of close-out netting and collateral arrangements 
relating to financial transactions.  
Local courts will remain charged with claims of local creditors and 
will resolve them on the basis of the local jurisdiction. The UNCITRAL’s 
Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation already provides 
an effective framework for court collaboration.67  
                                                      
67 The Guide discusses cooperation in cross-border cases and is based upon a 
description of experience and practice. Even the “Guidelines applicable to Court-
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3.7  Living wills 
In order to make resolution possible with limited repercussions on systemic 
stability, all European banking groups would be required to prepare and 
regularly update a document detailing the full consolidated structure of 
legal entities that depend on the parent company for their survival, and a 
clear description of operational – as distinct from legal – responsibilities 
and decision-making, notably regarding functions centralised with the 
parent company.  
The document should also include contingency plans describing 
possible recovery and winding up arrangements, also updated on an 
ongoing basis, taking account of key factors such as size, 
interconnectedness, complexity and dependencies (see BCBS, 2009b).68 
Reorganisation and winding up arrangements should be conceived as a 
menu of options covering such things as: all the claims on the bank and 
their order of priority; possible segregation arrangements of certain 
functions to be maintained in case of resolution; ex- ante commitments to 
conversion of contingent capital into common equity; powers of 
management to bring in new investors quickly with no need of 
shareholders’ approval; indication of which assets or divisions or 
subsidiaries might be sold to third parties in case of distress; group-wide 
contingency funding plan; the management strategy to de-risk the bank 
business in a short time and to deal with the failure of their largest 
counterparties (FSA, 2009b).  
The document should be made available to supervisors and the EBA, 
but not to the broad public. This information disclosure requirement would 
be part of the deposit guarantee contract that cross-border banks covered 
by the EU deposit guarantee scheme would need to sign with the new 
European Deposit Guarantee Agency (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4).  
In preparing their living wills, banks would remain fully free to 
decide the structure and organisation of their business, notably regarding 
the decision to set up branches or subsidiaries in the foreign jurisdictions 
where they operate. A legal structure that would greatly facilitate 
                                                                                                                                       
to-Court communications in cross-border cases”, adopted in June 2001 by the 
American Law Institute in association with the International Insolvency Institute, 
can provide further guidance to create a cooperation framework.  
68 On the role of living wills as catalyst for action, see Avgouleas et al. (2010). OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 65 
 
consolidated resolution is offered by the European Company (Societas 
Europea). The SE is a public-limited liability corporation, regulated partly 
by EU law69 and partly by the law of the member state, which allows a 
cross-border group to operate throughout the Union as a unitary group 
organised with a parent company and operational branches.70   
Even if this kind of ex-ante planning remains controversial within the 
financial community,71 it must be remembered that a number of regulatory 
authorities in the EU have already decided to impose such obligation on 
banks under their jurisdiction, notably including the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA, 2009b).72 A recommendation to move in this direction has 
also been adopted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2009 and FSF, 
2009). 
Improved disclosure through living wills would contribute to tackle 
the opacity of banks corporate structures, whose complexity might hamper 
effective supervision and resolution. The misalignment between legal 
forms and economic functions makes it extremely difficult for supervisors 
                                                      
69 The Societas Europea (SE) is regulated by the Regulation 2001/2157/EC and the 
Directive 2001/86/EC.   
70 See Dermine (2006) for a full analysis of the decision to expand banking activity 
abroad through branches or subsidiaries as against through the creation of a 
European Company (Societas Europea, SE) and a review of the case of the 
Scandinavian bank Nordea, which is not a SE yet because of financial stability and 
tax reasons. 
71 As affirmed by Ackermann (2009a), “detailed ‘living wills’ … that outline 
elaborate winding-down scenarios would not only be very theoretical, but would 
also lead to inefficient corporate structures that create trapped pools of capital”. 
72 Under legislation now before Parliament, the FSA will require banks to compile 
two distinct documents: the recovery plan and the resolution plan. The first one 
will set out the firm’s plan to respond to severe distress and should contain: i) a 
capital recovery plan and ii) a liquidity recovery plan. Once the bank moved into 
resolution, it would be for the supervisory authorities to decide the appropriate 
strategy on the basis of the resolution plan. The latter would explain the 
relationships between the different entities within the group and contingency 
responses in case of interruption of those relationships. The resolution plan will 
also be required to offer a detailed assessment of the potential obstacles to the use 
of resolution tools by the authorities. The bank will also need to identify the 
market and payment infrastructures to which they are connected and plan to 
disconnect itself from those systems in an orderly manner (FSA, 2009b). 66 | BANK CRISIS RESOLUTION 
 
to have a clear and comprehensive picture of banks activities and for 
resolution authorities to disentangle functions in case of crisis and failure.  
As has been mentioned (Box 3.1), the Basel working group on cross-
border bank resolution (BCBS, 2009b) has suggested that full consolidation 
could be accompanied by partial ring-fencing to protect systemically 
significant functions in a crisis, but not the financial institution itself, with 
positive effects on market resiliency and confidence. However, extending 
this approach to subsidiaries and, as some have suggested, even branches 
of foreign banks in the host jurisdiction, would utterly undermine the 
universal solution, and should be rejected. | 67 
 
 
4.  NEW SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS AT 
EU LEVEL 
he financial crisis has confirmed that there is neither an optimal nor a 
superior financial supervisory structure. A wave of reform of 
supervisory models has swept through many countries in the last 20 
years, either leading to a ‘single regulator’ model or to a regulatory 
architecture by objective.  
These reforms were justified by the blurring of boundaries between 
intermediaries, which undermined the traditional regulation by sector of 
activities (banking, securities, insurance)73 – in spite of some important 
persisting differences across sectors (Half & Jackson, 2002). At all events, no 
supervisory structure emerged as a clear winner in confronting the crisis; in 
the United Kingdom, coordination failures between the FSA and the Bank 
of England played a role in scaring Northern Rock depositors.  
As was to be expected, regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
mainly organised along national lines proved especially inadequate in 
tackling the cross-border dimensions of regulation and supervision. Within 
the European Union the crisis has exposed large loopholes in the allocation 
of supervisory tasks and the absence of rules for burden-sharing in case of 
crisis of a large EU cross-border banking group. It has become all too clear 
that cross-border banking, while bringing remarkable benefits, also poses 
formidable challenges for financial stability. 
Indeed, the EU authorities have been confronted with the ‘trilemma’ 
on how to reconcile the three objectives of financial stability, national 
                                                      
73 See De Luna Martinez & Rose (2003). 
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supervision and integrated financial markets.74 Only two of the three 
objectives may be achieved at the same time: with integrated financial 
markets financial stability requires at least some centralisation of 
supervisory powers for crisis prevention and crisis management at the EU 
level. However, not only have supervisory powers on large cross-border 
EU banking groups not been centralised at the EU level, but the allocation 
of tasks between home and host country authorities has created significant 
fragmentation in oversight. 
A key principle introduced by the Second Banking Directive is home 
country control. In compliance with this principle, the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD, 2006/48/EC) assigns responsibility for the 
consolidated supervision of ‘credit institutions’, including branches and 
subsidiaries, to the home country authority; host country authorities 
supervise ‘on a solo basis’ locally incorporated subsidiaries and have 
limited oversight of branches (regarding liquidity, see Article 41 of the 
CRD).75 Supervisory arrangements mirror the allocation of tasks between 
the home and host country regarding deposit guarantee and winding up 
and reorganisation of credit institutions (see Table 4.1). 
The architecture of supervision follows the legal structure of banking 
groups; however, Article 131 of the CRD provides that the host-country 
authority may choose to delegate its responsibility for the supervision of 
subsidiaries to the home-country authority. When the host-country 
supervisor delegates supervision, then the home-country supervisor has 
exclusive oversight over the entire group, both on consolidated and solo 
basis (Garcia et al., 2009). Delegation has the great merit of permitting fully 
consolidated supervision, but encounters formidable challenges due to the 
                                                      
74 On the trilemma of financial stability, see Schoenmaker (2009). 
75 However, Article 42a of the Capital Requirements Directive 2006/48/EC, 
inserted by Directive 2009/111/EC, has strengthened coordination and 
information-sharing mechanisms between the home and host authorities of 
systemically significant branches: host country authorities may request to the home 
country authority that a branch of a credit institution be considered significant on 
the basis of the deposit share of the branch in the host country (if higher than 2%); 
the impact of closure or suspension of operation of the branch on market liquidity 
and the payment, clearing and settlement systems in the host country; the size and 
the importance of the branch in terms of the number of clients within the banking 
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conflicts of interest between the home and host authorities, as will be 
described. 
Table 4.1 Allocation to home and host country of supervision, deposit insurance 
and resolution functions in the European Union 
 Prudential 
Supervisor 
Deposit 
insurance 
regulators 
Reorganisation 
and winding up 
authority 
Banks locally 
incorporated 
Parent banks 
authorised in 
home country 
 
 
Home country 
authorising 
parent bank 
(consolidated 
supervision – 
solvency) 
 
 
Home country 
 
 
Home country 
Subsidiaries of 
parent banks 
headquartered in 
another EU 
country 
Home country 
authorising 
parent bank 
(consolidated 
supervision – 
solvency) 
Host country 
authorising the 
subsidiary (‘solo’ 
basis) 
Host country 
 
 
Host country∗ 
Branches 
Branches of 
banks 
headquartered in 
another EU 
country 
Home country of 
head office 
(consolidated 
supervision – 
solvency) 
Host country 
(liquidity) 
Home country 
(possibility of 
supplementing 
the guarantee by 
host country) 
Home country 
∗While this is the formal legal arrangement, in practice the home country will also 
intervene in view of its responsibility for consolidated supervision. 
Source: Mayes et al. (2007). 
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The current structure of EU cross-border supervision entails a 
misalignment in incentives between home- and host-country supervisors 
when dealing with a faltering financial institution (Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 
2006; Herring, 2007). In particular, host countries are exposed to the impact 
of a crisis of local entities of foreign banks without adequate instruments of 
defence, in regard of both locally incorporated subsidiaries and local 
branches (which do not even have a separate balance sheet and income 
statement, being included in the parent company’s accounts). The 
vulnerability of host countries may be higher with regard to branches, since 
the host supervisor is unable to ascertain the real situation of the parent 
bank; the Icelandic crisis has shown vividly that the presumption of 
support by the parent company in case of need may be illusory. 
Home/host conflicts are exacerbated by asymmetries in financial 
resources and human capital of supervisors, the financial and legal 
infrastructure, and above all risk exposures (Herring, 2007). Risk exposure 
for the host country is higher when the foreign subsidiaries is large within 
the country, but relatively small or functionally unimportant for the parent 
bank and the home country, as is typically the case in small countries with 
a strong presence of foreign banks. The agency problem is exacerbated by 
cross-border banking groups typically centralising key corporate functions 
(e.g. liquidity, IT, large corporate lending, etc.) – which is not an accident 
but a main source of competitive advantage related to size and globalised 
operations.  
In case of crisis of a cross-border banking group, this structure of 
incentives entails strong home-country bias by national supervisors, which 
will give priority to national interests with little regard for repercussions in 
the host country. Home-country bias may also entail the promotion of 
national champions internationally (Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 2006), so that 
oversight of foreign operations tends to become more lenient. This may 
lead in turn to the parent bank undertaking excessive risks in its foreign 
operations with little effective oversight both by the home and the host 
authority. Competition within the EU market would also be distorted.   
The division of labour in the supervision of cross-border groups is 
strictly related to the fiscal responsibility for losses generated by bank 
failures. Lack of burden-sharing arrangements is a crucial factor 
exacerbating the agency problem between home and host country 
authorities; without clear commitments each country will tend to follow a 
beggar-my-neighbour policy. For instance, in the Fortis crisis the OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL | 71 
 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the supervisory 
authorities was swept aside as soon as the bank’s survival came into 
question, precisely because there was no agreement on burden-sharing. 
While the Belgian authorities were separately negotiating the sale of the 
bank’s main assets to a French banking group, the Dutch authorities did 
not hesitate to seize all banking and insurance assets within their 
jurisdiction and break up the group. 
4.1  Commission proposals for a new EU supervisory structure76   
The new supervisory structure proposed by the European Commission, 
now under consideration by Council and Parliament, may have a strong 
bearing on bank resolution regimes in the EU, although they do not modify 
national bankruptcy systems strictu sensu.  
On top of the new structure will be the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), which will give general risk warnings and recommendations 
on specific risks. It will specify the procedures to be followed by the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – part in turn of the European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) – to act upon its recommendations. 
The ESAs from their side should use their powers to ensure the timely 
follow-up to recommendations addressed to one or more competent 
national supervisory authorities. 
All new legislative measures are regulations, hence they will be 
directly applicable, with no need of transposition into national law. A 
political agreement on the different measures was reached in the EU 
Council in December 2009 under the Swedish presidency. The EU 
Parliament is currently considering the proposals but intends to go much 
further. 
The ESRB will only be consultative but will supposedly derive its 
authority from its reputation and expertise. It will be run by the ECB and 
be largely composed of EU central bankers, with limited participation of 
supervisors, and one representative of the Economic and Financial 
Committee. The ESAs, on the other hand, will have legal personality, with 
power to impose binding agreements to effectively coordinate supervision 
of cross-border groups, and will be composed of national regulators and 
supervisors. An important limitation in its powers, however, is that such 
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decisions could not impinge upon the fiscal responsibilities of the member 
states, hence the powers to liquidate a bank would remain at the home 
country level, in cooperation with the respective host countries. 
The changes which are being discussed in the United States (House 
Wall Street Act of 11 December 2009) are different from the EU since they 
assign macro-prudential oversight mainly to the Secretary of the Treasury, 
who will chair the Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), bringing 
together the different supervisory authorities and the Federal Reserve. The 
chair of the FSOC could make a systemic risk determination with respect to 
a specific financial company, and could order that it be placed under 
resolution. Excess dissolution costs would be paid by a Systemic 
Dissolution Fund (SDF) run by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC).77 
The role of the ESRB. The ESRB will be at the centre of the new EU 
oversight system, even if this body will only be consultative. Its twelve-
member Steering Committee is composed of the seven ESCB members 
(including the President of the ECB), the three chairs of the European 
Supervisory Authorities, a member of the EU Commission and the 
President of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). The dominance 
of the central bankers in the governance of the new structure is even clearer 
in the General Board of the ESRB, which comprises, apart from the Steering 
Committee members, all central bank governors of the EU-27. 
The ESRB will have its seat in the ECB and will rely on the analytical 
and administrative services and skills of this well-reputed and established 
institution. Thus, de facto it will be controlled by the ECB. The Finance 
Ministers have only one representative in the ESRB. Hence, 
notwithstanding the declaration of the Finance Ministers that they want to 
be in the driver’s seat, the power on top of the new EU oversight system 
will reside with the central bankers.  
The ESRB should define, identify and prioritise all macro-financial 
risks; issue risk warnings and give recommendations to policy-makers, 
supervisors and eventually to the public; monitor the follow-up of the risk 
warnings, and warn the EU Council in the event that the follow-up is found 
to be inappropriate; liaise with international and third country 
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counterparts; and report at least bi-annually to the EU Council and 
European Parliament. 
The ESRB should have access to all micro-prudential data and 
indicators. It could request the ESAs to provide information in summary or 
collective form. Should this information be unavailable (or not made 
available), the ESRB will have the possibility to request data directly from 
national supervisory authorities, national central banks or other authorities 
of member states.  
Crisis management is not mentioned as a task of the ESRB, but of the 
ESFS. This is a departure from the ad hoc agreement reached in the 
European Council in October 2008, whereby the President of the ECB (in 
conjunction with the other European central banks) formed part of a 
financial crisis cell, with the President of the Commission, the EU Council 
and the Eurogroup. The question thus remains to what extent the ESRB will 
be involved in micro-prudential matters. Would it, as the US Financial 
Services Oversight Council, be involved in recommending that a specific 
financial company poses a systemic risk, and order it to be broken up? This 
seems unlikely for the time being, given the sensitivity of member states 
with regard to fiscal powers, but is something that will need to be 
addressed sooner rather than later. 
The role of the EBA. Under the proposed Regulation 2009/0142, the 
European Banking Authority will replace the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), with a modified statutory role and broader 
powers in regulation and supervision at EU level, with also affects bank 
crisis resolution.  
The EBA will be responsible for: 
a.  moving towards the realisation of a single rulebook and its 
enforcement, by developing technical implementation standards that 
will be given legal enforceability throughout the Union by 
Commission endorsement;  
b.  ensuring harmonised supervisory practices and peer review of 
national authorities; 
c.  strengthening oversight of cross-border groups, including by 
participating in supervisory colleges (albeit only as ‘observer’, see 
Article 12 of the proposed regulation establishing the EBA);  
d.  coordinating EU-wide stress tests to assess the resilience of financial 
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e.  establishing a central European database aggregating all micro-
prudential information; and 
f.  ensuring a coordinated response in crisis situations. 
The proposed reforms will not modify the current emphasis on home 
country control but should allow it to function better. The EBA will 
formally participate in the Colleges of supervisors of cross-border groups, 
albeit only with observer status – an element of weakness that can yet be 
corrected; it will have to ensure that Colleges of supervisors effectively 
function as colleges78 and that information sharing works and, in case of 
disagreements, it will have formal powers to mediate between supervisory 
authorities. It will conduct regular peer reviews of supervisors with the 
goal of enhancing consistency in supervisory outcomes (Article 15). And 
under Article 13 of the proposed regulation, it “shall facilitate the 
delegation of tasks and responsibilities between competent authorities”: 
this provision clearly applies to the delegation of powers for crisis 
resolution. 
In emergency situations, the EBA shall facilitate and coordinate the 
actions taken by the relevant national supervisory authorities, and may also 
take decisions requiring national supervisory authorities to take action to 
remedy an emergency situation (Article 10). The power to determine the 
existence of an emergency situation will be in the hands of the EU Council, 
following consultation with the Commission, the ESRB and the ESAs: a 
cumbersome procedure that may be inconsistent with the rapid decisions 
required in emergency – the EBA should be allowed to act independently 
in this regard, we believe. The EBA will also be charged with coordinating 
EU-wide stress test and, to this end, it will establish a central European 
database, thus being at the centre of information gathering and 
dissemination. 
Article 10.2 provides that the EBA can call on national authorities to 
take action to address “adverse developments that may jeopardize the 
orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability … of 
the financial system”; in case the competent authorities failed to comply, 
the Commission proposal had also envisaged, under Article 10.3, that the 
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EBA could directly address an individual decision to a financial institution 
“requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations … including 
the cessation of any practice”. These powers would be essential in resolving 
banking crises, but were eliminated in the ECOFIN compromise of 
December 3, 2009. In its draft report, the competent European Parliament 
Committee has restored the Commission text and has strengthened the role 
of the EBA, allowing it to appeal before national courts against decisions 
taken by national authorities. 
The creation of the ESRB and the ESAs are a big step forward 
towards a more unified European regulatory and supervisory system, also 
for bank resolution regimes. However, many questions remain unresolved 
and can only gradually find an answer, as the new structures emerge. The 
biggest problem ahead will be to find a proper balance between the new 
European entities and the home and host country powers and structures. 
Some further steps forward feasible within the present Treaty structure are 
outlined below.   
4.2  Supervisory powers for resolution of pan-European banks 
Following the recent crisis, many countries advocated full ring-fencing of 
financial organisations operating within any given jurisdiction, which 
would then be subject to host authorities’ full regulatory and supervisory 
powers in banking crisis resolution, as the only practicable solution. Host 
country powers would notably include the possibility to ring-fence the 
assets of branches and subsidiaries, or the option for the host country to 
impose the establishment of locally incorporated subsidiaries with own 
capital and liquidity, and adequately separate operating functions 
(‘subsidiarisation’)79 – something that runs up against freedom of 
establishment but in practice has been happening already in jurisdictions 
with a large presence of foreign banks, e.g. in Eastern Europe.  
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This approach has started to look attractive also to the authorities in 
the main financial centres, most notably the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA, 2009a) on grounds that this is the only solution in the 
absence of a complete EU framework. However, this approach obviously 
entails significant efficiency losses of reduced integration of banking and 
would damage the EU single market.  
A viable alternative would be to maintain the current allocation of 
powers between home and host authorities, but concentrate certain 
supervisory powers at EU level, building upon the Commission proposals 
that have been described.  
Strengthened obligations to cooperate at EU level in information 
sharing are already contained in the revised CRD (see Directive 
2009/111/EC) and the proposed regulation for the establishment of the 
EBA. The revised CRD requires that the consolidating supervisor shall 
establish Colleges of supervisors to facilitate the exercise of powers in 
Articles 129 (information gathering and dissemination, and also planning 
and coordination of supervisory activities “in preparation for and during 
emergency situations”) and 131 (delegation and written coordination and 
cooperation agreements), under guidelines for the operation of Colleges 
that will be issued by the EBA.80  
However, these coordination arrangements still seem to fall short of 
what is needed in case of crisis of a cross-border group, as was vividly 
shown by the fate of MoUs when crisis struck pan-European groups like 
Fortis. The key weakness in MoUs is that they do not provide host 
countries with strong and credible guarantees that their national interests 
and stakeholders will be treated fairly by the home country authorities, and 
that domestic financial stability will not be compromised by decisions 
taken abroad which they would be unable to influence.   
Indeed, what is needed is arrangements that will make it possible to 
exploit the benefits of fully consolidated (‘universal’) supervision and 
resolution by the parent company’s authorities and at the same time 
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reassure host country authorities that their interests are fully and fairly 
taken into account, so that delegation of powers to the home country 
authority becomes acceptable. Otherwise, consolidation and delegation 
would not be acceptable: for the simple reason that the home country 
supervisor would be responsible for financial stability in the host country 
without being accountable to the host country government and taxpayers 
(Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 2006). 
What is needed is an integrated system of supervision, deposit 
guarantee, crisis management and resolution capable of providing the host 
country with adequate protection and participation in the ‘universal’ 
consolidated supervision and resolution procedure. This system has three 
procedural building blocks: a new EU Deposit Guarantee Agency (EDGA) 
handling deposit guarantee for cross-border banking groups; a private 
contract between EDGA and guaranteed banking groups specifying their 
commitments and obligations on disclosure and living wills; an EU system 
of mandated corrective action for cross-border banking groups in difficulty 
effectively banning supervisory forbearance.  
4.3  A new framework for supervision 
The new European System of Financial Supervisors envisages a network of 
national and EU supervisory authorities, leaving supervision of financial 
institutions at the national level and entrusting coordination of cross-
border groups to strengthened Colleges of supervisors led by the parent 
banks’ home authorities. This solution is inadequate because it leaves 
ample supervisory gaps and room for conflict between national 
supervisors, and thus great uncertainty as to who is responsible for doing 
what. A step forward is needed. 
All pan-European banking groups should be supervised, subject to 
mandated corrective action and resolved on a consolidated basis under the 
law of the parent company. The universal principle should cover foreign 
branches and subsidiaries – with the sole exception of subsidiaries that 
could demonstrably survive as stand-alone entities even in case of 
dissolution of the parent company.  
Under this new EU framework, supervision, mandated corrective 
action and resolution would still be managed by the strengthened Colleges 
of supervisors, under the leadership of the parent company supervisor: but 
it would the responsibility of the EBA to supervise the procedure, sanction 
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interested parties. Colleges would bring all of their proposals to the EBA, 
which would give them legal power with its own decisions: including the 
start of mandated corrective action and forced recapitalisation, changes in 
management, selling assets, branches and segments of activity, or set up a 
bridge bank, and the resolution of disputes that may arise between national 
supervisors and individual stakeholders.  
In this manner the benefits of using existing supervisory structures 
would be combined with the elimination of distorted incentives and 
conflicts of interests between national supervisors. Placing the EBA at the 
centre of the system of universal resolution thus is critical for its 
acceptance: this is the crucial step in order to sell centralised universal 
resolution to all stakeholders.  
The proposed Omnibus Directive (2009/0161) already envisages that 
the consolidating supervisor shall inform the EBA of the activities of the 
Colleges of supervisors, including in emergency situations, and 
communicate all the information of particular relevance for the purposes of 
supervisory convergence. At all events, it seems also appropriate to have in 
the Colleges a full member designated by the EBA, as has been mentioned. 
This new supervisory structure should have full power to manage 
mandated action and resolution of cross-border banking groups on a 
consolidated basis (Chapter 3). A new European Deposit Guarantee 
Agency should be set up as an EBA arm entrusted with the management of 
a new European Deposit Guarantee Fund, based on the principles and rules 
outlined in Chapter 2. Protection of depositors at national banks with no 
significant cross-border activities could remain with national systems, 
which of course would need much less funds than today.   
All European deposit-taking financial institutions with significant 
cross-border deposits basis would be required to join the EU deposit 
guarantee scheme and, in order to do so, would be required to sign a 
contract with EDGA committing them to provide supervisors and the EBA 
with full information on group organisation, functional lines and 
counterparties – including ‘living wills’ detailing how the various creditors 
and stakeholders would be treated in case of failure (see Chapter 3). 
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4.4  A European system of Mandated Corrective Action 
As has been argued, a system of mandated corrective action by supervisors 
acting early as banks under their surveillance show emerging signs of 
undercapitalisation and funding difficulties, is key to contain moral hazard 
created by the deposit guarantee and protect the guarantee fund. Mandated 
early action is also of the essence to inhibit regulatory forbearance.   
The key issue is one of incentives. Benston & Kaufman (1988) argued 
that the introduction of a system of Structured Early Intervention and 
Resolution (SEIR) is necessary in order to make deposit insurance incentive 
compatible. Their model is based on capital thresholds, so that as capital 
ratios decline the regulator is allowed or obliged to impose corrective 
measures, which become progressively more pervasive with falling capital 
ratios. Reorganisation and liquidation are mandatory when capital falls 
below critical thresholds.  
This was the model introduced in the United States for depository 
banks in 1991 with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act: a system of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) for insured 
depository institutions was created to “resolve the problems of insured 
depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to the Deposit 
Insurance Fund”.81 As shown in Table 4.2, the PCA system introduced five 
‘capital zones’ for insured depository institutions: well capitalised, 
adequately capitalised, undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised and 
critically undercapitalised. The capitalisation ratios are calculated both on 
risk-adjusted and unadjusted basis. Corrective measures are in part 
compulsory, in part left to the authorities’ discretion, and include a broad 
range of requirements and restrictions (e.g. suspension of dividend 
payments, restriction of asset growth, compulsory recapitalisation). When a 
bank is critically undercapitalised, authorities are obliged to close it, and 
this happens well before capital is depleted.  
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Table 4.2 Summary of Prompt Corrective Action Provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Ratios (percent) 
 
Risk Based 
 
Leverage   
Zone 
 
Mandatory Provisions 
 
Discretionary Provisions 
 
Total 
 
Tier 1 
 
Tier 1 
 
1. Well  capitalized 
 
 
 
 
 
>10 
 
>6 
 
>5 
 
2. Adequately  capitalized 
 
1.  No brokered deposits, except with 
FDIC approval 
 
 
 
>8 
 
>4 
 
>4 
 
3. Undercapitalized       
 
 
1. Suspend  dividends  and  management 
fees 
2.  Require capital restoration plan 
3. Restrict  asset  growth 
4.  Approval required for acquisitions, 
branching, and new activities 
5. No  brokered  deposits 
 
1. Order  recapitalization 
2. Restrict  inter-affiliate 
transactions 
3. Restrict  deposit  interest  rates 
4.  Restrict certain other activities 
5.  Any other action that would 
better carry out prompt 
corrective action 
 
<8 
 
<4 
 
<4                   
 
 
4. Significantly 
undercapitalized 
 
1.  Same as for Zone 3 
2. Order  recapitalization* 
3.  Restrict inter-affiliate transactions* 
4.  Restrict deposit interest rates* 
5.  Pay of officers restricted 
 
1.  Any Zone 3 discretionary 
actions   
2.  Conservatorship or receivership 
if fails to submit or implement 
plan or recapitalize pursuant to 
order 
3.  Any other Zone 5 provision, if 
such action is necessary to carry 
out prompt corrective action 
 
<6 
 
<3 
 
<3 
 
5. Critically  undercapitalized         
 
 
1.  Same as for Zone 4 
2.  Receiver/conservator within 90 days* 
3.  Receiver if still in Zone 5 four quarters 
after becoming critically under-
capitalized 
4.  Suspend payments on subordinated  
debt* 
5.  Restrict certain other activities 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
<2 
                       
 
 
* Not required if primary supervisor determines action would not serve purpose of prompt corrective action or if certain other conditions are met. 
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Following the US example, under the deposit guarantee system that 
we have outlined, the EBA should have full powers, and indeed be obliged 
to act to impose changes in management, recapitalisation and asset 
disposals of cross-border banks as capital falls.82 Action must start well 
before net worth becomes negative, based on predetermined automatic 
triggers. It should be stressed that without mandated corrective action, 
rather than purging the system from moral hazard, the deposit guarantee 
will inevitably end up rescuing failing deposit-taking institutions, the fund 
will be rapidly depleted and taxpayers will be called in to foot the bill. 
There should be no doubts that the system of mandated corrective action is 
there to ensure the protection of the guarantee fund, not financial 
institutions. 
A European system of Mandated Corrective Action (EMCA) must 
have three features.83 First, in the United States PCA is based on uniformly 
defined capital and leverage ratios, based on US rules, so that no problem 
of geographic inconsistency arises. Conversely, the definition of capital 
across European countries is heterogeneous, due to the discretion left by 
the Capital Requirements Directive in national implementation. However, 
for the EMCA system to work properly, the definition of capital (total 
capital and Tier 1 capital) should be the same across European countries, to 
avoid geographic distortions and regulatory arbitrage. There is also a need 
to agree on uniform application of accounting principles for all pan-
European groups, including those operating also in the United States with 
subsidiaries that may use US GAAP rather than the IFRS (see Box 4.1).  
EBA, which is already charged with harmonising supervisory tools 
and practices, should also be entrusted with the task of standardising the 
triggers for early intervention. This implies an enormous workload, as even 
for quantitative measures, such as non-performing loans, no harmonised 
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externalities. 
83 For a proposal to introduce a system of corrective action in Europe see ESFRC 
(1998) and ESFRC (2005). Mayes et al. (2007) and Nieto & Wall (2006) analysed the 
preconditions and the desirability of a PCA system in Europe. 82 | NEW SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS AT EU LEVEL 
 
measurement exists in the EU at present. And it is even more difficult for 
qualitative measures, e.g. when and how to replace (parts of) the 
management or the board of a bank, sell businesses or create a bridge bank.  
Second, in the US system intervention thresholds include reference to 
an absolute leverage ratio, while in the European Union leverage for 
regulatory purposes is calculated on a risk-adjusted basis. As we have 
argued, in practice risk-adjusted capital requirements are not only easy to 
circumvent but also logically flawed, since risk cannot be measured 
independently of market sentiment, and therefore should be scrapped 
altogether. Be that as it may, for the purposes of early mandated action 
reference to absolute leverage is a must, as the only unquestionable 
indicator of capital strength not open to interpretation (at least to the extent 
that the accounting definition of capital is unambiguous).  
The third requirement for an effective EMCA is that it should apply 
to deposit-taking banking groups at a consolidated level. The application of 
EMCA at the consolidated level is key to tackle the implicit guarantee for 
deposit-taking of which the entire group benefits and should aim at 
avoiding the concentration of excessive leverage in non-depository 
subsidiaries. The US prompt corrective action, for example, is an 
incomplete system, as highlighted by the financial crisis: in fact, it applies 
only to depository institutions and not to banking groups as a whole. As a 
result, the high leverage of the major bank holding companies was 
concentrated outside of their major deposit-taking subsidiaries: the lack of 
corrective action powers for non-depository financial institutions and for 
bank holding companies impeded the prompt intervention by the FDIC 
and other federal supervisors.84 
Box 4.1 What is in a leverage ratio? 
The leverage ratio (capital/total assets) should show the maximum 
(percentage) loss a bank can make on its assets before losing all of its capital.  
It has thus been proposed to add a crude leverage ratio to the standard risk 
weighted capital ratios under the Basel regime.  However, this idea raises one 
practical and conceptual problem: a transatlantic comparison of leverage 
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ratios is almost impossible given the different accounting principles used in 
the EU (IFRS) and the US (GAAP).   
The key problem is that these two accounting systems yield in general 
similar results, but they present completely different pictures in the case of 
derivatives. Derivative exposure is reported gross under IFRS, but net under 
US GAAP. The case of Deutsche Bank shows what difference this can make. 
Under IFRS Deutsche Bank has a balance sheet (as measured by assets) of 
around €2 trillion. Deutsche Bank has published its own evaluation of how 
large its balance would be under US GAAP, arriving at only €1 trillion. 
Assuming Deutsche Bank knows how to apply US GAAP, this implies that its 
leverage would be halved if it were judged under US GAAP. 
 
 
Source: Ackermann (2009b). 
The key difference between IFRS and US GAAP is thus the treatment of 
the item called (under IFRS) ‘Positive market values from derivatives’, equal 
to €1.224 billion on Deutsche Bank’s IFRS balance sheet.  Under US GAAP 
this item would shrink to about one tenth, with only 128 billion appearing 
under ‘derivatives post netting’. A similar observation applies to the liability 
side of the balance sheet. Under IFRS Deutsche Bank shows also over 1.2 in 
liabilities under ‘market values of derivatives’, which presumably would also 
be reduced by a factor of about 10 under US GAAP.* 84 | NEW SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS AT EU LEVEL 
 
What is the reason for this huge difference in the way derivatives show 
up in the balance sheet? Here is an explanation from an accounting point of 
view: “IAS 39 Financial instruments is the core standard under IFRS for 
derivatives. It is a complex and somewhat controversial accounting standard 
that has been the subject of extensive debate. Essentially IAS 39 is based on a 
simple premise – derivatives must be recognized on the balance sheet at fair 
value. Historically, under many national GAAP, driven by a historical cost 
perspective, derivatives remained unrecognised as there is no initial cost, as 
in a swap, for example. The only recognition of their effect may be the 
matching of the relevant underlying with the derivative on settlement. 
Therefore a company could have an entire portfolio of derivatives at the year 
end with little or no recognition in the financials as there is no upfront cost as 
such.”** This passage suggests that under US GAAP most derivatives do not 
appear on balance sheets as there is no initial cost. 
This difference between IFRS and US GAAP could resolve to some 
extent the mystery why the US authorities were surprised by the extent of the 
market reaction to Lehman: Lehman’s balance sheet reflected US GAAP and 
thus did not show the extent of the exposure of other market participants. It is 
likely that the balance sheet of Lehman under IFRS would have been several 
times larger, thus giving a better picture of the importance of Lehman. An 
IFRS balance for Lehman would have given a better picture of the importance 
of this operator for the market. 
Moreover, a balance sheet under IFRS would give a better picture of the 
exposure of the bank itself to counterparty risk. Assume a bank has a large 
amount of derivatives contracts outstanding, but without any net exposure. It 
could still make very large losses in case important counterparties fail.   
_____________________ 
* For other categories (loans, repos, etc.) the difference between IFRS and US 
GAAP are minor. This implies that transatlantic comparisons should still be 
possible for banks without a large derivatives exposure.  However, this is not the 
case for investment banks (or the investment banking arms of EU universal 
banks).  And in this crisis the problems arose often in the investment banking 
side. 
** Source: http://accounting-financial-tax.com/2009/04/accounting-treatment-
for-derivatives-gaap-under-ifrs/. In the US unlisted investments available for sale 
are stated at cost whereas under IFRS they are recorded at fair value once a 
reasonably reliable measure can be established. 
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4.5  Burden-sharing arrangements 
As has been described, the key problem with existing nation-based 
arrangements is that they do not incorporate the cross-border externalities 
that may be generated by the failure of a pan-European bank: hence, the 
authorities in the home country charged with the consolidated supervision 
of EU banking groups tend to disregard the negative spillovers that might 
occur in host countries from the crisis of the group or local subsidiaries. 
The resulting coordination failure in crisis management and resolution is 
aggravated by a lack of ex-ante agreements for sharing the costs of 
liquidation across countries, in case of bankruptcy of a cross-border 
financial group. Experience has confirmed over and over again that 
supervisory cooperation can hardly survive when a crisis occurs and losses 
have to be divided; in the absence of ex-ante burden-sharing criteria, 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies may prevail and make crisis management 
and resolution more complex and costly (Herring, 2007). 
This issue cannot be resolved here and is only examined cursorily for 
the sake of completeness. The system of deposit guarantee cum early 
mandated action that we have outlined goes a long way towards reducing 
the eventual burden for taxpayers of a banking crisis, but it cannot 
eliminate it altogether.  
Therefore, it might be advisable to create a last line of defence 
through the creation of a fund for the liquidation of emerging losses from a 
banking crisis that cannot possibly be borne by creditors and shareholders; 
ideally, such fund should be privately financed, i.e. by the financial system 
itself. Proposals for such a ‘resolution fund’ have been put forth recently by 
authoritative spokesmen for the banking system. However, these proposals 
have one fundamental weakness: since banks have declared their 
unwillingness to finance it ex-ante, and propose that funds be raised from 
capital markets, a public guarantee will inevitably be required to convince 
investors to buy those securities. Therefore, the possibility of an eventual 
fallout onto taxpayers still looms large.  
An alternative would be to create a straight public fund. Goodhart & 
Shoenmaker (2009) have proposed the creation of a ‘general fund’ to be 
managed by the ECB85 or by the European Investment Bank, entrusted with 
the recapitalisation of large EU banks in case of crisis. This fund is an 
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example of ‘generic’ burden-sharing by countries proportionate to the size 
of the participating countries: the burden is apportioned between countries, 
regardless of the location of the failing bank. Alternatively, a ‘specific’ 
burden-sharing might be envisaged, whereby only countries in which 
distressed banks are present should bear the cost of support. Along these 
lines, a proposal for a European Financial Protection Fund has been put 
forth by the Rapporteur of the Economic and Financial Committee of the 
European Parliament, Garcia-Margallo, in his draft report on the regulation 
establishing the EBA (see his proposed Article 12a). The fund aims at 
protecting European depositors and reduces the cost for taxpayers of a 
systemic financial crisis; it would be financed by European financial 
institutions and by issuance of debt guaranteed by the member states. In 
exceptional circumstances and in a systemic crisis, should these resources 
be insufficient, the affected member states would bear the cost according to 
burden-sharing arrangements based on a combination of criteria, including 
assets, deposits, revenues and share of the payment system. 
Overall, in any burden-sharing model the key problem is the 
objective determination of the costs falling on each country: a mix of 
complementary indicators might be identified by the EU Council based for 
instance on the size and geographical distribution of banking assets and 
liabilities, and perhaps other factors such as income and employees.  
As already mentioned, however, the circumstances when the fund 
would be authorised to intervene must be carefully circumscribed, since 
otherwise moral hazard would re-enter the system from the back door and 
market discipline would be weakened once again. Intervention by the fund 
should only be permitted as a last resort, to cover liquidation losses for 
clear public-interest reasons, and never for shareholders. At all events, a 
key obstacle related to ex-ante burden-sharing with public resources is that 
parliaments in the member states would in all likelihood resist the idea of 
setting aside resources in national budgets to bail out private firms. 
Perhaps, the only viable solution, entailing minimum distortions to 
private incentives, would be for the member states to decide a key for 
allocating residual losses between themselves, and rely on the EBA and 
supervisory mechanisms that have been described to minimise any such 
residual losses. The key would also apply in case a new systemic crisis 
called again for massive government interventions.    | 87 
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